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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which La Otra Campaña (The
Other Campaign) has succeeded in constructing anti-capitalist
social coalitions in Mexico. Through a social movement theoretical
lens, I analyze the dynamics of three distinct movements within La
Otra: (1) the indigenous Zapatistas of Chiapas, (2) the CNUC, a
campesino group from Tlaxcala, and (3) the Pancho Villas, an
urban housing organization from Mexico City. Based on personal
interviews, field notes, and participant observation, this paper
compares the tactics and organizing techniques employed by
each movement. It explores the ways in which the Zapatista project
of “autonomy” has been appropriated in unique ways by the
movements in Tlaxcala and Mexico City. Overall, I argue that
although alliances have been built and allegiances strengthened,
there remain various structural and ideological differences
impeding La Otra’s progress and its ultimate goal to transform
Mexico through the development of genuine grassroots
democracy.
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I. Introduction
And so the EZLN has resisted 12 years of war, of military, political,
ideological and economic attacks, of siege, of harassment, of
persecution, and they have not vanquished us. We have not sold
out nor surrendered, and we have made progress. … But there are
things, the most important ones, such as our demands for which
we struggle, which have not been fully achieved. To our way of
thinking, and what we see in our heart, we have reached a point
where we cannot go any further, and, in addition, it is possible that
we could lose everything we have if we remain as we are and do
nothing more in order to move forward. The hour has come to take
a risk once again and to take a step which is dangerous but which
is worthwhile. Because, perhaps united with other social sectors
who suffer from the same wants as we do, it will be possible to
achieve what we need and what we deserve. A new step forward
in the indigenous struggle is only possible if the indigenous join
together with workers, campesinos, students, teachers, employees
… the workers of the city and the countryside.
—The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle, June
2005

In June of 2005, with the release of its Sixth Declaration of the
Lacandona Jungle (La Sexta), the Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN) began La Otra Campaña,1 the newest phase in its
global resistance movement against neoliberalism. La Otra called
for a broad alliance between civil organizations and actors united
by a common goal: creating a democracy of the people (Higgins
1

La Otra Campaña translates as “The Other Campaign.” From herein, it will be referred to
simply as, La Otra.
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2004). Twelve years earlier, on New Year’s Day of 1994, the same
day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into
effect, the EZLN had emerged from the Lacandona Jungle in
Chiapas to declare war on the Mexican state, seizing four
municipalities in Chiapas, including the important colonial city, San
Cristóbal de las Casas. An insurgent group composed of mostly
indigenous Mexicans, the EZLN fought for economic, social, and
cultural justice for the indigenous peoples of Mexico, themselves the
victims of over 500 years of racial discrimination and economic
exploitation. The Zapatistas rejected the NAFTA treaty on the
premise that indigenous farmers would lose their lands to large
agro-businesses subsidized by the Mexican and U.S. governments. In
the years following the rebellion, the Zapatistas would become a
major political force in Mexico, seizing an estimated 250,000
hectares of land and declaring autonomy from the Mexican
government (Rus 2005, 1).
The Zapatistas are credited with helping lead to the PRI’s
defeat in the 2000 presidential election (Collier 2005, 450). That year,
Vicente Fox became the first opposition candidate to win the
Mexican presidency in 70 years, crumbling the PRI’s corporatist
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model and one-party stronghold over the state and its institutions.2
Still, 16 years after the Zapatista Rebellion, Mexico remains a far cry
from achieving democratic stability. Fox brought a renewed sense
of hope to many Mexicans, including the Zapatistas, whose dispute
he promised to resolve in “15 minutes” (Ramonet 2001, 134). But
such optimism soon waned, as Zapatistas and Mexicans alike lost
faith in policies failing to produce substantive social change. Under
Fox, Mexico’s economy grew to become the ninth largest in the
world, but employment figures within the country fell (Camp 2007,
285). Between 2000 and 2005, more than four million Mexicans
traveled to the U.S. searching for work (Gibler 2009, 14). Drug
violence worsened under Fox’s presidency, and Mexican authorities
met giant protest waves in San Salvador Atenco and Oaxaca City
with brutal repression, committing numerous human rights violations.
Three years into Fox’s presidency, only 40 percent of the nation,
compared to 67 percent when he first took office, believed the
country was on the right path (Camp 2007, 223). By 2005, 83
percent of Mexicans were dissatisfied with democracy and viewed
the country as pursuing the wrong path (239).
2

Three main political parties currently govern Mexico: the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional), the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), and the PRD (Partido de la Revolución
Democrática). Camp identifies the PRI as a far-right party, the PAN as center-right, and the
PRD as leaning to the left. The Zapatistas wouldn’t necessarily agree with these
classifications. They believe all to be corrupt, and, in terms of policy-making, usually
associate the PAN with the U.S. Republican Party and the PRD with the U.S. Democratic
Party. They consider the PRI to be a non-ideological party interested only in money and
power.
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This is the climate under which the Zapatista’s Otra Campaña
burst onto the political stage four and a half years ago with the
release of La Sexta. In September of 2005, more than 2,000
individuals gathered in the Zapatista civilian center of Francisco
Gómez, located in the Lacandona Jungle, for La Otra’s first
assembly. For two days, activists from urban youth groups, feminist
collectives, trade unions, NGOs, and indigenous movements met to
discuss the organizational, structural, and political makeup of La
Otra (Mora 2007, 66). Through this meeting came the decision to
organize a six-month speaking and listening tour through Mexico—
an effort to recruit new members to the 181 indigenous associations,
68 leftist groups, 197 social organizations, 474 NGOs and collectives,
and 2,000 individuals already subscribed to La Otra (Ross 2005, 2).
On January 1, 2006, Subcomandante Marcos (the masked, pipesmoking spokesman of the EZLN), the 16 members of La Sexta
Commission,3 a caravan of Otra adherents, and independent
journalists began their journey through Mexico’s 31 states to discuss
La Otra’s plans for an alternative project, from below and to the
left, to the Mexican political system. “‘Below’ implies bottom-up,
grassroots self-organization among the rural and urban working
class and poor. … ‘To the left’ signifies that the Other is both
3

La Sexta Commission included 16 of the EZLN commanders responsible for helping draft
La Sexta document during a month-long meeting in La Realidad in June of 2005.
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theoretically and practically anti-capitalist” (Cuninghame 2007, 86).
The tour consisted of public speeches and meetings where Marcos
and the others sat listening to peoples’ concerns and to
descriptions of their distinct forms of struggle. Time limits to these
platicas were rarely set, and no subject remained off limits (Gibler
2009, 209-210). Out of the tour came an attempt to unify Mexico’s
oppressed populations into forming an anti-capitalist coalition.
The standard elements associated with democracy include
having open and fair elections, “legitimizing the legal system,
maintaining supremacy over the military, protecting human rights,
and achieving social justice” (Camp 2007, 10). Since 2006, Mexico
has fallen short on each of these fronts. That summer, Fox’s fellow
PAN party member, Felipe Calderón, won an election many
believed to be marred by electoral fraud (Cuninghame 2007, 80).
The majority of the population—58.2 percent—did not vote,
producing Mexico’s highest absentee rate since 1946 (Camp 2007,
223). Two-thirds of the non-voters said they were disillusioned with
Mexican politics (223). Since being elected, Calderón has relied
heavily on the armed forces, from both the police and military
branches, to combat the country’s growing problems of drugrelated violence and organized crime. As of December 2009, an
estimated 45,000 troops were deployed throughout the country
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(Caputo 2009, 65). In some places, as is the case in the violent
border region of Ciudad Juárez, the military has taken over outright
control of the police, amounting to what those on the far left call a
situation of undeclared martial law.
More than 14,000 people, many with little or no connection to
the drug trade or other illegal operations, have been killed since
Calderón mobilized the army three years ago to fight Mexico’s drug
cartels (Caputo 2009, 63). While the President continues to insist that
these deaths are collateral damage in the “War on Drugs,” it is
becoming increasingly clear that it is a war perpetrated by the
state itself. “It’s murder,” Mexican journalist Lydia Cacho4 says
(public lecture 2010). Militarization has affected not only those living
in and around the country’s drug rings. The military’s presence has
spread across Mexico, from Chiapas to Juárez, serving as a tool of
the Mexican government to silence a growing resistance
movement in opposition to the state’s corrupt and quasi-dictatorial
methods. Put simply, post-PRI Mexico is a country without a rule of
law, where 93 percent of the people convicted of a crime never
face a judge or see an arrest warrant; ninety-two percent are
convicted without physical evidence (Bowden 2010). According to
4

Cacho is an award-winning journalist who has reported extensively on child pornography
and female sex trafficking in Mexico. Her work has linked Mexican politicians, businessmen,
and police to both of these. In 2005, she was abducted and tortured by state police with
authorization from Puebla’s governor. She lived to write about it (public lecture 2010).
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an April 2009 report by Human Rights Watch, thousands have been
victims of human rights abuses by the Mexican military and police,
including enforced disappearance, killings, torture, rapes, and
arbitrary detentions. Virtually none of these homicides and abuses
have gone thoroughly investigated by the Mexican judiciary
system. The perpetrators of the crimes, i.e., police and military
officials, are rarely subjected to prosecution.5 And when cases do
reach the appropriate courts, victims’ rights to fair trials and due
process are often denied (“Uniform Impunity” 2009, 2).
In terms of social justice, a vast gap remains between
Mexico’s rich and poor. The United Nations Development Program
estimates that 53 million Mexicans (49.3 percent of the population)
live in poverty, on less than $4 a day, while another 15 million live in
extreme poverty, on less than $1 a day (Gibler 2009, 99). At the
same time, Mexico boasts 24 billionaires and 85,000 millionaires.
Mexican businessman Carlos Slim Helú topped Forbes magazine’s
2010 list of the richest people in the world, with an estimated net
worth of $53.5 billion. Nine Mexicans made the list of the world’s

5

In Mexico, violations committed by military officials, even those as egregious as rape and
murder, are often investigated and prosecuted by the military itself. Not surprisingly, this
creates favorable conditions for military officials charged with the crimes. In its report, HRW
documents 17 cases of abuses committed by soldiers, for which not a single soldier was
convicted of his alleged crime. Under international law, military courts do not have
jurisdiction to try cases involving serious human rights abuses committed against civilians.
According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “Everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law” (“Uniform Impunity” 2009, 68).
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thousand richest, and four were in the top hundred (Bloomberg
News 2010, 1). What explains such uneven economic growth?
Harvey attributes this disparity to the broad neoliberal6 reforms
implemented in Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. In sum, these
policies reduced government funding for public works and
agriculture, privatized key state businesses, and created interest
rates more appealing to foreign capital. In Mexico City in 1985, for
instance, government expenditures for social services fell 12
percent for transportation, 25 percent for potable water, 18 percent
for health services, and 26 percent for trash collection (Harvey 2005,
100) (see sections regarding Theoretical Basis, La Sexta, and the
CNUC for an analysis of the impact of neoliberal policies,
particularly NAFTA, on Mexico’s agrarian populations). The
concentration of wealth into the hands of the world’s elite (i.e., the
CEOs of large pharmaceutical, insurance, and arms companies, as
well as the heads of financial institutions) have led Harvey and

6

As defined by Harvey, “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. …
Deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social
provision have … entailed much ‘creative destruction’, not only of prior institutional
frameworks and powers but also of divisions of labor, social relations, welfare provisions,
technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the
land, and habits of the heart” (2005, 2-3).
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others to conclude that neoliberalism was “from the very beginning
a project to achieve the restoration of class power” (16).7
In Mexico, businessmen profited handsomely from the
privatization programs associated with neoliberalism. In 1994, of the
24 Mexicans who made Forbes list of the world’s richest, 17 took
part in privatization, “buying banks, steel mills, sugar refineries, hotels
and restaurants, chemical plants, and a telecommunications firm as
well as concessions to operate firms within newly privatized sectors
of the economy, such as ports, private toll highways, and cellular
and long distance telephony” (Harvey 2005, 103). Carlos Slim, of
course, became the chief beneficiary of these pro-business policies.
He accumulated most of his wealth from the privatization of the
country’s national telephone company under President Carlos
Salinas, to which Slim bought the rights to run a seven-year
monopoly over Mexico’s phone services (Gibler 2009, 7). Today,
Slim’s telecommunications empire extends into Latin American and
U.S. retail stores, including Circuit City and Barnes and Noble. His
strategy for cell-phone service is simple: “capture and monopolize
7

The uneven results of neoliberal reform are equally as striking in the U.S., where, “since
1980, the year Ronald Reagan was elected president, the incomes of people at the top
have doubled while those in the middle and at the bottom have remained flat. … In the
1950's and 60's, the CEO's of major American companies took home about 25 to 30 times
the wages of the typical worker. In 1980 the big company CEO took home roughly 40 times
the worker's wage. By 1990, it was 100 times. And by 2007, executives at the largest
American companies received about 350 times the pay of the average employee. In
many of the top corporations, the chief executive earns more every day than the average
worker gets paid in a year” (Moyers 2010).
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the high-density and affluent markets and leave the low-density
and poorer markets without service” (Harvey, 104). So while
neoliberal “free-trade” policies have made Mexico’s version of the
American dream possible for businessmen like Slim, the poorest of
Mexico—lacking the resources and funds to compete with
transnational corporations—have fallen more deeply into poverty,
like that inside the refugee camps of Pohlo, Chiapas, where
hundreds of families have been displaced from their homes by
state-sponsored paramilitary groups, forced to resettle in the
mountains, with literally nothing to their name (Hayden 2002, 93).
“The invisible Mexico of beneath is full of Pohlos,”8 one Zapatista
told me (personal correspondence 2009).
And so, amidst this environment of corruption, drug wars,
impunity, human rights violations, repression, and social inequality,
La Otra Campaña is calling for a “national campaign for building
another way of doing politics, for a program of national struggle of
the left,” in which all those oppressed in Mexico and the world—
indigenous people, workers, campesinos, students, teachers, sex
workers, women, children, among others—are invited to participate
in a global resistance movement against the capitalistic system.

8

I have personally translated all quotes borrowed from interviews and conversations
conducted while in Mexico (i.e., with activists from the Zapatistas, the CNUC, the Panchos,
and others) from Spanish to English.
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Obviously, capitalism functions within a construct of power. The
Mexican political class drives the capitalistic system, the Zapatistas
say, which is why La Otra Campaña is, in both theory and practice,
anti-political and anti-capitalist. But what differentiates La Otra from
other social movements seeking radical change? Certainly this isn’t
the first time in Latin American history that populations have
mobilized against neoliberalism and the elite political establishment
propelling such policy. What does La Otra coalition look like, what
are its governing principles and organizational strategies, and how
does it propose to form this network? What potential obstacles does
it face?
This paper aims to answer these broad questions, and to
analyze, in particular, the extent to which La Otra has succeeded in
forming anti-capitalist social coalitions in Mexico.9 This essay has four
components. The first section will explain the theoretical framework
for La Otra, both in the context of Latin American indigenous
movements and, more specifically, that of Zapatismo. The second
section will analyze La Sexta and its anti-capitalist, anti-political
postures. In the third, I will look at the concept of Zapatista

9

My research is based off personal interviews and conversations, field notes, and
participant observation carried out in Mexico during the summer of 2009. I spent three
weeks living in Oventic with the Zapatistas, three weeks in Tlaxcala living with CNUC
organizers, and two weeks in Mexico City living with the Panchos. I also rely on relevant
literature dealing with the Zapatistas, indigenous protest movements, and social
movement theory.
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autonomy, describing my personal experience in one of the
Zapatista autonomous communities, Oventic, and the lessons it
provides to two other movements that I have analyzed. Finally, the
fourth section will explore the ways in which two organizations within
La Otra—one a largely peasant group from Tlaxcala, another an
urban movement from the outskirts of Mexico City—have sought to
articulate the lessons of the Zapatista communities and form their
own programs of autonomy. I argue that education has proved
vital to the construction of anti-hegemonic projects within their
autonomous spaces. I will also discuss their organizational strategies
and how effective these efforts have been in forming movement
coalitions. Overall, my research suggests that although coalitions
have been built and resistance networks strengthened, the
challenge persists of bringing together distinct groups—some with
divergent goals and ideologies—under a unified front. This is
perhaps the inevitable dilemma in a movement framed as a
struggle for autonomy, in which each community has its own way of
defining and implementing democratic processes. This paper does
not serve to prognosticate either the success or doom of La Otra
Campaña. Doing so just five years into its creation would be
unrealistic. Rather, it reflects on La Otra’s emergence in the context
of modern Mexico, then assesses the ways and extent to which La
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Otra’s ideas and concepts have manifested themselves in other
Mexican social movements.
Before delving too deeply into La Otra’s core components,
we need first to understand how such a broad group of movements
and actors fused together to form La Otra. Owing to the fact that
La Otra is an extension of the indigenous Zapatista movement, the
theoretical underpinnings for its emergence onto Mexico’s political
scene lie first in an explanation of the EZLN’s own surfacing. Such an
examination warrants a look at the factors responsible for the
increase in the mobilization of Latin America’s indigenous
populations during the 1980s and 1990s. In other words, under what
political and economic circumstances did Latin America’s
indigenous movements arise, and how did this climate help shape
the Zapatistas’ call for the broader, more inclusive, anti-capitalist
struggle of La Otra Campaña?

II. Theoretical Basis
In the decades leading up to the 1980s, Latin America saw very little
in the way of successful mobilization from its indigenous populations.
Historically, argues Deborah Yashar, this can be attributed in part to
the dually repressive and assimilationist policies of the Latin
American governments. Today, indigenous peoples make up the
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majority of the population in Bolivia and Guatemala, while
constituting significant percentages in Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru.
Mexico has the most indigenous people, with over 16 million
(Cuninghame 2007, 82). From the Spanish conquest to the modern
day, states have openly encouraged miscegenation in order to
“whiten” the Latin American population into a single mestizo10 class
(Yashar 1996, 89). In his book, México Profundo: Reclaiming a
Civilization, Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla argues
that since the conquest, the Mexican people have been
dominated by an “imaginary México” imposed by the West. It is
imaginary not because it does not exist, but because it denies the
cultural reality lived daily by most Mexicans.
The recent history of Mexico, that of the last five hundred years, is
the story of permanent confrontation between those attempting
to direct the country toward the path of Western civilization and
those, rooted in Mesoamerican ways of life, who resist. The first
plan arrived with the European invaders but was not abandoned
with independence. The new groups in power, first the creoles and
later the mestizos, never renounced the westernization plan. They
still have not renounced it. Their differences and the struggles that
divide them express only disagreement over the best way of
carrying out the same program. The adoption of that model has
meant the creation within Mexican society of a minority country
organized according to the norms, aspirations, and goals of
Western civilization. They are not shared, or are shared from a
different perspective, by the rest of the national population. To the
sector that represents and gives impetus to our country's dominant
civilizational program, I have given the name ‘the imaginary
Mexico.’ (1996, xv-xvi)

10

Mestizo refers to people of mixed racial ancestry, in Mexico, of mixed indigenous and
Spanish ancestry.
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For Bonfil, Mexico’s indigenous population constitutes “the México
profundo.” Quite notably, he places blame on Mexico’s mestizo
class for its complicit role in the “folklorization” of indigenous culture
and for moving the nation down a Western path—in an economic,
political, and cultural sense. Bonfil’s thesis offers one plausible
explanation for the indigenous revolts of the 1980s—that their rise
was, in fact, a calculated response to over five centuries of
oppression, discrimination, and exclusion of Latin America’s
indigenous populations. But this alone does not explain the timing of
indigenous organization. Why did indigenous populations suddenly
begin to organize collectively, and with relative success, in the
1980s, unlike at any other time in history?
Yashar posits that Latin America’s recent indigenous
movements result from a combination of three factors: political
liberalization, changes in state reform policies, and pre-existing
networks of social organization. The shift in the 1980s towards
political liberalization in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico
provided a new platform for indigenous actors to express their
ethnic identities and demands (1998, 38), one which previously had
been silenced under repressive state and federal regimes. Yet, as
Yashar points out, political liberalization did not, by itself, cause the
politicization of indigenous identity nor the development of social
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movements. Such phenomena occurred due to the adverse effects
political liberalization had on the indigenous populations. Prior to
the 1980s, Latin American states were structured around populist
and/or corporatist models (1998, 32).11
In Mexico, for instance, dating back to the 1930s, Chiapan
peasants had relied on federal and state-sponsored peasant
organizations for virtually all their resources, including land and
subsidies, in exchange for PRI-party loyalty (Washbrook 2005, 427).
Within such a system, indigenous peasants became reliant on the
state for access to land, credit, and services. The state actually
encouraged participation in campesino groups, insofar as the
indigenous peoples joined state-sponsored organizations and
identified themselves as peasants, thus playing into the state’s
assimilationist policies encouraging a mestizo identity. If indigenous
people formed independent peasant organizations, as occurred in
1970s Chiapas—when indigenous peoples began challenging the
PRI landowners for spots in the municipal government—federal and
state authorities often responded with co-optation and selective
repression (Washbrook 2005, 427). Ironically, though, these pre-1980
policies also granted the indigenous greater political and economic

11

Corporatism implies “a formal relationship between selected groups or institutions and
the government and state.” Within Mexico, corporatism functioned together with
“presidencialismo—where all political power lies in the President’s hands” (Camp 2007, 10).
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independence from the state. “Greater state penetration, land
reforms, and freedom of movement often increased indigenous
peasant independence from local landlords and enabled
indigenous communities to strengthen and (re)construct local
public spaces for community authority structures and customary
law” (Yashar 1998, 33). In other words, an unwritten deal existed
between the state apparatus and its indigenous populations, one in
which the state—in return for “cooperation” from indigenous
peasants—would agree to interfere sparingly with local indigenous
practice and law. In Mexico, such “cooperation” implied voting for
the PRI, joining state-sponsored peasant organizations, and not
questioning or protesting PRI authority. This “hands-off” approach
pursued by the state, though perhaps unintentionally, both allowed
for and led to greater indigenous autonomy (Rus 1994, 284).
Since the 1980s, state reforms in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico
have witnessed a substitution of neoliberal economic policies for
the corporatist agrarian ones of decades past. Consequently,
budgets for agriculture, social services, and economic programs
have plummeted, and the traditional protections for peasant land,
such as for Mexico’s ejidos (legally protected communally owned
lands), have been eliminated (1998, 34). In the case of Mexico,
President Miguel de la Madrid ushered in the neoliberal era in the
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early 1980s by privatising and selling off Mexico’s national industries.
Upon taking office in 1988, President Salinas accelerated Mexico’s
economic liberalization, increasing the influence of the private
sector and advocating for an internationalization of the economy
with the U.S. and Canada (Camp 2007, 3). The economic
restructuring exacerbated the gap between rich and poor
peasants in Chiapas (Collier 2005, 453). For Latin America as a
whole, from 1980 to 1992, real agricultural wages fell by 30 percent
(Yashar 1998, 34). Hence, from an economic perspective,
indigenous protest movements were a response to the deteriorating
economic situation created by neoliberalism, coupled with
changes in state reform policies that no longer provided the
material rewards associated with the corporatist and populist
models.
Even more ominous for the indigenous peoples, however, was
the threat that such policies, particularly those related to land
ownership, posed to their local autonomies (Yashar 1998, 35).
Salinas’ 1992 decision to reform Article 27 of the Mexican
constitution, taking away peasants’ right to petition for unused land
or land held by the state, is the clearest example of this. Indeed,
Salinas’ reversal would provide the final impetus for the Zapatista
Rebellion. According to Yashar, “Land demands are the symbolic

19
glue that enables communities with diverse needs to mobilize
behind a common cause. … [They] do not just refer to land as a
productive resource but increasingly refer to the state’s obligation
to respect the jurisdiction of indigenous authorities and customary
law over geographic space” (1998, 36). In short, political
liberalization both enabled and propelled the indigenous revolts of
the 1980s. First, by freeing up important channels previously
censored and closed off by authoritarian leadership, liberalization
opened the floodgates for indigenous expression and independent
organization. At the same time, the new laissez-faire approach
reversed years of corporatist policy, under which peasants had
become dependent upon state governments for resources and
land. Fearful that their economic situation would continue to
deteriorate, and in the absence of democratic institutions to
negotiate and resolve their land disputes, the indigenous turned to
collective action.
Lastly, Yashar considers the importance of pre-existing
organizational networks to the proliferation of Latin America’s
indigenous movements, arguing that such networks were and
remain critical to effective mobilization. For example, churches
played prominent roles in building and strengthening indigenous
peasant networks in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador,
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often providing the necessary means of communication and
literacy skills connecting one community to another (1998, 37). In
Chiapas, Bishop Samuel Ruiz was instrumental to the Zapatista
uprising. He helped organize indigenous meetings, contributed
resources to the people, and pushed for local organizing.

From the EZLN to La Otra
Yashar’s argument provides a sound theoretical basis for
understanding the Zapatista movement. In the following discussion, I
will briefly analyse the historical antecedents of the EZLN thus far
undiscussed, afterwards moving through a synopsis of the events
since 1994 that led to the development of La Otra Campaña. The
EZLN takes its name from Emiliano Zapata, the heroic peasant
leader of the Mexican Revolution.12 The Zapatista movement can
be traced back to a Marxist group from the late 1970s called the
Forces of National Liberation (FLN), an urban guerrilla group which
formed, along with dozens of political-military organizations during
this contentious era, as a reaction to the Mexican government’s
repression of student movements in 1968 and the early 1970s

12

Zapata was the leader of the southern front of the Mexican Revolution. He is known
especially for his Plan de Ayala which called for the return of 1/3 of all Mexico’s hacienda
lands to campesinos. This helped lead to the overriding legacy from the Revolution—the
creation of Article 27 in the Mexican constitution, which committed the Mexican
government to ejido land redistribution. Such land reforms were first implemented during
the 1930s under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (Jung 2008, 87).
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(Washbrook 2005, 423).13 The FLN was forced underground to the
Lacandona Jungle, where, as Subcomandante Marcos explains,
the FLN forged relationships with independent peasant
organizations composed of mostly indigenous farmers. In 1983,
amidst state-sponsored repression, the FLN joined with the
indigenous peasants to create the EZLN. The EZLN, then, was born
primarily through a fusion of two distinct groups: indigenous
peasants with a history of revolt and militant leftists inspired by the
revolutionary tales of Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. According to
Harvey, the leaders of the FLN did not impose their Marxist ideology
on the indigenous communities. Instead, they “attracted recruits
because many of these communities were tired of failure,
manipulation, leadership rivalries, and ideological disputes. More
important they were tired of living in the same poverty and of
facing the same repression as had existed prior to their
organizational efforts of the 1970s” (Harvey 1998, 164).
Marcos’s Marxist beliefs changed after his “encounter with
indigenous culture.” The organization’s top-down structure also
evolved after exposure to the indigenous communities’ practices of
13

In October of 1968, 10 days prior to the opening of the summer Olympic games in
Mexico City, police officers and military troops shot into a crowd of unarmed students at
Tlatelolco Plaza. Thousands of students were beaten, jailed, and disappeared. Forty years
later, official death tolls remain a mystery. The authoritarian regime at the time of the
massacre launched no formal investigation, hiding video footage of its own security forces
arbitrarily shooting into the mass. It was not until 2001 that an investigation was finally
initiated. Still, no charges to date have been pressed, and only 40 of an estimated 3,000
deaths have been documented (“Mexico’s 1968 Massacre” 2008).
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collective decision-making (Harvey 1998, 165-167). Still, verticalism
remained ingrained within the EZLN for years, at least until 2003,
when the EZLN began separating itself from the decision-making
processes of the Zapatista communities, leaving such matters up to
the democratically-elected Juntas de Buen Gobierno—Good
Government Councils (a later section will elaborate further upon this
transition in the context of Zapatista autonomy) (EZLN 2005, 5). Still,
the Marxist roots of the Zapatista movement are significant
because, although the Zapatistas did not declare themselves as
anti-capitalists in 1994 (a fact critics still point to), the ideological
seeds of their anti-capitalist movement were already planted within
the EZLN ranks. Its leaders, Marcos especially, knew that neoliberal
policies would not bode well for rural indigenous peasants, the base
of the Zapatista movement.
And so, on New Year’s Day 1994, the Zapatistas launched
their rebellion in demand of “work, land, housing, food, health care,
education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace”
(Bob 2005, 118). Within 12 days, amidst international pressure, and
embarrassed by documented human rights abuses and national, as
well as international, media coverage, the Mexican government
ended the violence by signing a unilateral peace accord. In the
years following the rebellion, the Zapatistas gained international
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recognition, attracting hundreds of NGOs, forming the world’s first
Internet solidarity network, and becoming a global force for antineoliberalism movements. Bob argues that the Zapatistas owe their
success to the movement’s willingness to modify their goals and
tactics in order to appeal to broader audiences (2005, 119). From
the start, the decision not to classify Zapatismo as strictly indigenous
proved important because it provided a “mirror in which oppressed
groups everywhere could see themselves” (2005, 152). In other
words, the Zapatistas’ ability to frame themselves as an inclusive,
non-violent, non-hierarchical, and grassroots “new social
movement,” fighting for the rights not just of indigenous peoples,
but of women, children, and peasants alike, resonated and
garnered sympathy within national and international circles. Years
later, these diverse networks of support would prove crucial to the
formation of La Otra.
Despite the strongly inclusive nature of the EZLN, in the years
following the 1994 uprising, Zapatista political efforts focused
predominantly on securing rights and land for Chiapas’ indigenous
populations, the origin and base of its support. As I will suggest, the
EZLN’s transformation into La Otra can be construed partly as
recognition of its failure to achieve significant and lasting political,
economic, and social change for Chiapas’ indigenous peoples. In
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fact, the 1994 rebellion did nothing to change the structure or
economy of Chiapas, nor did it improve residents’ standard of living
(Solís 2005, 463). Instead, the Chiapan countryside remained in
“terminal crisis. … The reason for this is not difficult to discern: the
entrenched structural poverty has been compounded by neoliberal
policies imposed by the Mexican state, a consequence of which
have been reductions in real levels of public expenditure and
investment” (Solís 2005, 462). In 2004, the World Bank estimated that
67 percent of the Chiapan population lived below the poverty line
(462).
In what appeared to be a giant step towards realizing the
Zapatista goals for autonomous self-government, the San Andrés
Accords on Indigenous Culture and Rights were signed by the EZLN
and the federal government on February 16, 1996. The following is a
synthesis of the agreements laid out in the treaty:
Rights of the peoples: A claim to the right of recognition of
indigenous peoples as such, and therefore to their right to free
determination. This right is not proposed as a claim to sovereignty
but to autonomy, and this implies the following:
a) The recognition of the communities as bodies of public
law and of the right of communities and municipalities to
associate freely to concert and coordinate their actions.
b) The recognition of the territories and of the jurisdiction of
the indigenous peoples. As far as jurisdiction is concerned,
there is a claim to the recognition and respect of: their
internal normative systems; their own forms of government,
which implies the delegation of faculties and competence
to their organizations, including their own procedures for
the election of local authorities; and specific norms and
institutions, in order to give attention to their needs, agreed
upon between the indigenous peoples themselves and the

25
State, thus substituting the indigenous conceptions for
others that are pluralist. (Esteva 2001, 256-257)

In the months following the accord, the Zedillo government backed
out on verbal commitments to fulfill its conditions, instead ordering
police and military actions against the Zapatistas. Throughout 1997,
the EZLN pursued a series of unsuccessful initiatives trying to reopen
talks with the state, including a march of over 1,000 men and
women to Mexico City in September. Meanwhile, paramilitary
groups, financially backed and euphemistically referred to as
“armed civil groups” by federal and state authorities, flourished
throughout Chiapas (Esteva 2001, 257). In December of 1997, in
what became known as the Acteal Massacre,14 PRI-sponsored
paramilitaries murdered 45 indigenous men and women praying
inside a church (Rus 2003, 18-20). Refusing to settle for anything less
than what the San Andrés Accords had initially promised, the
Zapatistas moved to self-implement the accords, threatening the
legitimacy of the federal government by creating 38 “autonomous
municipalities—spaces in which local people exercise a radical
democracy amid constant harassment” (Esteva 2001, 258).
14
According to Hayden, the Acteal massacre was “carried out through a
counterinsurgency technique as old as the Conquest itself—the arming of paramilitary
units composed of Indians willing to kill other Indians for advantage” (2002, 91). Forty-three
of the 45 victims were shot in the back, 20 were women, including four who were
pregnant, and 18 of those killed were children. Although the shooting continued for nine
hours, Mexican troops, stationed just minutes away, failed to respond. The community
members of Acteal of the Bees are extremely religious peoples who practice strict nonviolence (91-93).

26
In the spring of 2001, following Fox’s landmark victory in 2000
and his campaign promise to fix the Zapatista conflict in “15
minutes,” the Congreso Nacional Indígena (CNI) and the Zapatistas
organized a seventeen-city, 3,000 km march for Indian rights.
Coined la Marcha del Color de la Tierra—the March of the Color of
the Earth—hundreds of thousands of indigenous and nonindigenous actors gathered in Mexico City’s Zócalo15 to support the
Zapatista claims for autonomy. In the end, the Mexican Senate
delivered a watered-down version of the conditions agreed upon in
the 1996 San Andrés Accords, limiting indigenous autonomy and
treating Indians as subjects of “public interest.” Territory still
belonged to the Mexican state. Both the CNI and the EZLN outright
rejected the proposal.16 Nevertheless, on August 14, 2001, the
constitutional reforms on indigenous rights and culture became law
(Rus 2003, 22).
The Zapatistas’ 2001 failure to reach a bilateral agreement for
indigenous autonomy with the Mexican government effectively
ended their relationship with the state. In 2003, in an act of further
defiance of the state, they moved to strengthen their local
15

The Zócalo is the main plaza or square in the heart of Mexico City.
Rodolfo Stavenhagan, Mexican anthropologist and the United Nations special
rapporteur for human rights and indigenous questions said the law violated Convention
169 of the International Labor Organization on Indigenous Rights (which Mexico signed in
1990) by bypassing popular consultation. The Mexican Academy of Human Rights also
rejected the proposal on the grounds that it allowed state legislatures to supersede any
laws created by indigenous communities (Stahler-Sholk 2007, 53).
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autonomy through the establishment of regional representative
Good Government Councils based in centers called Caracoles
(Stahler-Sholk 2007, 55). Two years later, they released La Sexta
Declaración and called for La Otra Campaña. What explains this
turn of events? Put simply, the Zapatistas had exhausted all
institutional and diplomatic paths. Negotiating through the Mexican
political system no longer seemed a viable option. La Otra’s firm
rejection of any association with political parties differentiates it
from Latin America’s other indigenous movements, particularly
Bolivia, where in 2006 Evo Morales became the first indigenous
president in the country’s history.17 The Zapatistas looked at their
communities and saw progress with the successful implementation
of self-government, the development of methods for selfsufficiency, and the construction of primary and secondary schools.
And yet, it remained unclear how substantive and sustainable such
gains would prove to be over the long haul. Within these same
communities, poverty and the threats of repression from
paramilitary groups persisted. Meanwhile, at the state and federal
levels, the Zapatistas saw few signs of social change or reform. The
defeat of the PRI had not revolutionized Mexican politics. Be it PRI,
PAN, or PRD—in the eyes of the Zapatistas, each political party
17

Morales handily won a second presidential term in December of 2009, with 63 percent of
the Bolivian vote.
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preached the same corrupt, neoliberal agenda. As a result,
Mexico’s poor had grown more impoverished, more desperate for
some type of change.
The Zapatistas’ call for La Otra, then, was recognition of the
fact that they were not strong enough—that they lacked the
internal capacity and manpower necessary to transform Mexico by
themselves. After years of struggling for indigenous rights, it was time
to fight for the rights of other exploited Mexicans, too. In this vein, La
Otra aimed to rekindle and build upon the relationships the EZLN
had established since 1994. As EZLN advisers remarked after signing
the San Andrés Accords in 1996,
The importance of San Andrés is as a starting point, not by any
means as an end point or final goal. It is part of the autonimization
of civil society as a whole. The EZLN understands perfectly well that
with only indigenous autonomy the old regime will not fall and that
this will be possible only with the autonomy and liberty of all the
Mexican people. (Aubry 2003, 227)

To frame this from a theoretical standpoint, La Otra is an example of
an upward scale shift—“when collective action moves to a higher
level, moves contention beyond its local origins, and touches on the
interests and values of new actors” (Tilly & Tarrow 2006, 94). Facing a
languishing movement, perhaps foreseeing future demobilization,
the Zapatistas looked to expand upon and radicalize their
indigenous base. In short, La Otra’s plan to form a broad alliance of
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actors, from beneath and to the left, sought to reinvigorate
mobilization.

III. La Sexta and the Zapatista “Left”
La Sexta document is divided into six parts. The first two, “What We
Are” and “Where We Are Now,” review much of what we have
already covered in detail, laying out the historical foundations and
evolution of the Zapatista movement since the 1994 uprising. The
subsequent two sections, “How We See the World” and “How We
See Our Country Which is Mexico,” explain the anti-capitalist and
anti-political postures of La Otra in the context of the modern-day
political and economic landscape of Mexico. Capitalism is defined
as a
social system, a way in which a society goes about organizing
things and people, and who has and has not, and who gives
orders and obeys. … Capitalism means that there are a few who
have great wealth … obtained by exploiting the work of the
many. … Capitalism turns everything into merchandise, it makes
merchandise of people, of nature, of culture, of history, of
conscience. According to capitalism, everything must be able to
be bought and sold. And it hides everything behind the
merchandise, so we don’t see the exploitation that exists. (EZLN
2005, 8-9)

The EZLN’s description of capitalism is very much a re-articulation of
Marxist views. In particular, the above excerpt draws on Marx’s
labor theory of value, the idea that the worker, despite producing
the surplus value, i.e., the profit that makes the capitalistic system
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function, receives none of this extra money. Instead, the individuals
and/or the investors in charge, pocket the money. According to
Marx, such hidden exploitation amounts to robbery, since the
capitalist, in effect, steals the value produced by the worker. We
also see reference to what Marx called the “fetishism of
commodities” (Harvey 1990, 100), which describes the tendency to
reify everything, overlooking the social conditions, often
exploitative, behind the production of a given item. For instance,
we understand a pen as something that writes, not as something
with a whole series of social relationships and processes behind it.
The Zapatistas then frame neoliberalism according to Lenin’s theory
of colonialism and Gramsci’s18 essays on cultural hegemony:
And then capitalism needs many markets – or a very large
market, a world market. And so the capitalism of today is not the
same as before, when the rich were content with exploiting the
workers in their own countries, but now they are on a path which is
called Neoliberal Globalization. This globalization means that they
no longer control the workers in one or several countries, but the
capitalists are trying to dominate everything all over the world. …
They respect nothing, and they meddle wherever they wish. As if
they were conquering other countries. That is why we Zapatistas
say that neoliberal globalization is a war of conquest of the entire
world, a world war, a war being waged by capitalism for global
domination … does as it wants, it destroys and changes what it
does not like and eliminates what gets in its way … destroys their
culture, their language, their economic system, their political
system, and it also destroys the ways in which those who live in that
country relate to each other. So everything that makes a country
a country is destroyed. (EZLN 2005, 9-10)
18

Antonio Gramsci was a revolutionary Marxist born in Ales, on the island of Sardinia in
1891. He grew up in poverty, won a scholarship to the University of Turin in 1911, and joined
the Socialist Party of Italy around 1913. In 1921, he joined the Communist Party of Italy,
before being elected to the Roman parliament in 1924. Two years later, he was arrested
by Mussolini’s Fascist regime and sentenced to 20 years of prison, where he wrote about
hegemony and his theoretical approach to educative politics (Coben 1998, 9-13).
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Lenin predicted that the capitalistic order, in order to sustain and
accelerate its accumulation of wealth, would develop monopolies
and expand globally, marking a new imperial phase to capitalism.
In the Zapatista framework, neoliberalism is the modern-day form of
this imperialism. For Gramsci, hegemony referred to the ideas
structuring a society that help maintain the power of its leading
class. Western capitalism, then, has become the hegemonic
discourse dominating Mexico. In the minds of the Zapatistas, it has
infiltrated all levels of Mexican society, causing, among other things,
the de-Indianization of national identity. That’s why indigenous
languages have disappeared from schools and Mayan culture has
been minimized to museum artifacts.
La Sexta argues that the Mexican political class drives the
capitalistic system, destroying the social fabric of the Mexican
people (EZLN 2005, 11). It describes the negative effects that
capitalistic policies, like NAFTA, have on most Mexicans. In the
countryside, agricultural jobs are lost to large transnationals,
including over one million from 1994-2002 (Gibler 2009, 127).
Between 1995 and 2005, employment in Mexican maquiladoras—
giant export-oriented assembly plants with sweatshop conditions—
increased from 648,300 to 1.16 million (Delgado-Wise & Covarrubias
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2007, 5). According to Martha Ojeda, director of the Coalition for
Justice in the Maquiladoras, “Most maquiladora workers are very
young, between 16 and 25, because their eyes, backs, and hands
haven't given out yet. Their hours are so long that their youth passes
without seeing the sun” (Mekay 2003, 2). In the absence of jobs,
many Mexicans leave their families and migrate north of the
border—not out of want, but necessity. From 1980 to 2002, Mexican
migration to the U.S. soared by 452 percent (Gibler 2009, 127).
Meanwhile, Mexican businessmen and politicians continued to
prosper. “Are we saying that politics serves no purpose? No, what
we mean is that THAT politics serves no purpose. And it is useless
because it does not take the people into account” (EZLN 2005, 13).
La Otra, on the other hand, vows to take the people into
account—at least those sharing its ideals, that is. Among
Zapatismo’s governing values is un mundo donde quepan muchos
mundos, a world in which many worlds fit. Of course, not all worlds
fit under La Otra’s framework. La Otra’s counter hegemonic project
calls for a new way of doing politics in which civil society,19 not
elected officials from the three main political parties—the PRI, PAN,
and PRD—govern the country. La Sexta declares that “the EZLN will

19

In the Zapatista context, civil society is defined as “the sphere of autonomously
organized society, in opposition to that established by the state or directly controlled by it
or associated to it” (Dinerstein 2009, 9).
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establish a policy of having alliances with non-electoral movements
and organizations that define themselves, in theory and practice, as
of the left” (EZLN 2005, 20). But what does this “left” signify? To begin
with, the PRD, the so-called leftist party of Mexico, does not fall
within La Otra’s construct of the left. In fact, much of the PRD today
is comprised of PRI dissidents (Camp 2007, 233). In 2001, the PRD
betrayed the Zapatistas by helping sign into law the PAN
government’s diluted version of the San Andrés Accords on
Indigenous Autonomy. Adolfo Gilly, a former advisor to
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, the PRD presidential candidate who lost
the infamously fraudulent 1988 election to the PRI-ista Salinas, says
the PRD has become a mere replica of the PRI. Andrés Manuel
López Obrador, the PRD’s 2006 presidential candidate, who lost to
Calderón in another allegedly fraudulent election (Cuninghame
2007, 80), ran on the slogan: “For the good of all us, the poor are
first.” But Obrador evaded such issues as NAFTA during the
campaign trail, leading Gilly to conclude that he and the PRD party
promote little more than a “developmentalist project to stabilize the
neoliberal reforms already in place. It is a proposal to be applied
through public policies from the top, without any participation
whatsoever of independent, autonomous organizations within
society itself” (Gilly 2006, 81).
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Still, La Otra’s definition of the left remains nebulous. It sends
an open invitation to anyone willing to assume the charge of
“another way of doing politics.” But what does this constitute? If not
THAT politics, what kind of politics does La Otra “Left” practice? The
answer to this question continues to be a highly contested issue
among social scientists. Zapatista sympathizers, such as Holloway,
insist that La Otra abides by the underlying principle governing the
autonomous Zapatista communities, the mandar obedeciendo—
lead by obeying—a concept that the leaders of the movement
must obey the members, and that all major decisions should be
taken through a process of collective decision-making. Thus, the
Zapatista plan is horizontal, both in theory and practice. While it
respects and learns from the texts of Marx, Lenin, and Engels, it
rejects the vertical structures of traditional Marxist-Vanguardism.
Further, it disagrees with their definition of revolution as something
that must be achieved by means of the state. In the words of
Holloway:
Zapatismo is the project of changing the world without taking
power. … Zapatismo moves us decisively beyond the state illusion.
By the state illusion I mean the paradigm that has dominated leftwing thought for at least a century. The state illusion puts the state
at the center of the concept of radical change. The state illusion
understands revolution as the winning of state power and the
transformation of society through the state. … If the state illusion
was the vehicle of hope for much of the century, it became more
and more assassin of hope as the century progressed. The failure
of revolution was in reality the historical failure of a particular
concept of revolution, the concept that identified revolution with
control of the state. (2005, 5-6)
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La Otra’s revolution claims to have no intention of seizing state
power. For the Zapatistas, social transformation, i.e., radical
change, cannot be achieved via the state, but only through the
willpower of ordinary citizens. It is a revolution based not on power,
but on human dignity, defined by the Zapatistas as the idea that
“one is somebody simply to the extent he or she is involved in the
human endeavor, in actively claiming one’s place within a human
community, in reclaiming direct links with other human beings” (De
Angelis 2007, 5). Historically, revolution has been treated as a means
to an end, for example, the idea that a socialist state will overthrow
and take the place of a capitalist one. But in the Zapatista context,
revolution is neither so concrete nor static. “Revolution,” as one
Zapatista describes it, “is like going to take lessons in a school that
has not even been built” (Holloway 2005, 8). Critics characterize
such rhetoric as vague, one lacking any real solution or plan of
action. Yet, according to Holloway, this is precisely the point. The
Zapatistas “walk, not in order to arrive at a promised land, but
because the walking itself is the revolution” (2005, 8). This abstract
way of thinking also bears resemblance to Marx’s notion of true
democracy as “a democratic political practice that does not yet
exist or, more precisely, has not yet been recognized—and cannot
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yet be ‘named’—rather than a stable concept awaiting its
systematic presentation” (Williams 2007, 148).
Utopian or not, this is the program La Otra calls for in La Sexta.
In the document’s final two sections, “What We Want To Do” and
“How Are We Are Going To Do It,” the EZLN outlines its proposals for
carrying out its national and global agenda:
In Mexico…
1. We will continue fighting for the Indian peoples of Mexico but
not only for them nor only with them, but, rather, for all the
exploited and dispossessed in Mexico. And when we speak of all
the exploited of Mexico we are also speaking of the brothers and
sisters who have had to go to the United States to seek work in
order to survive.
2. We are going to listen to and speak directly, without middlemen
nor mediations, to the simple and humble Mexican people, and
depending on what we hear and learn, we will construct, together
with these people who are like us, humble and simple, a national
plan for struggle, but a plan that will, clearly, be of the left, which is
to say anti-capitalist, or antineoliberal, or which is also to say in
favor of justice, democracy and freedom for the Mexican people.
3. We will try to construct or reconstruct another way of practicing
politics, in the spirit of serving others, without material interests, with
sacrifice, with dedication, with honesty, a way that keeps it word,
or, that is to say, in the same way that militants of the left – who
were not stopped by violence, jail or death, and much less with
offers of dollar bills – have done so.
4. We will also keep looking at ways to rise up; a fight to demand
that we create a new Constitution, new laws that take our
demands, those of the Mexican people, into account, which are:
housing, land, work, food, health, education, information, culture,
independence, democracy, justice, freedom and peace. A new
Constitution that recognizes the rights and liberties of the people,
and that defends the weak against the powerful. (EZLN 2005, 5)

Point four seems to run in contradiction to the non-state, anti-power
approach articulated by Holloway. Does not re-writing the
constitution necessarily imply navigating through the traditional
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institutional channels of government? This is a fair question and one
of the main criticisms brought against La Sexta. In fact,
constitutional reform has been one of the Zapatistas’ principle
demands since the January 1994 rebellion. However, according to
Tom Hansen, founder of the Chicago-based Mexico Solidarity
Network, which has close ties to the Zapatistas, the demand for a
constitution has been removed from the table. My personal
conversations with Otra adherents seemed to indicate this much as
well, as none of them were cognizant of plans to rewrite the
constitution. Within Mexico, La Otra officially began its 12-month
listening tour on January 1, 2006, through which it would compose
its “national plan for struggle.” The tour, however, was halted in
early May after the sudden events in San Salvador Atenco, Mexico
State when state police met large street protests with repression.20
The human rights abuses and subsequent arrests at Atenco
became an immediate rallying point for La Otra, as Marcos vowed
20

On May 3, 200 police officers arrived at a market in San Salvador Atenco, a municipality
of Texcoco, with orders to evict street vendors for illegally selling flower seeds. The vendors,
many peasants from the organization El Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de La Tierra (FPDT),
protested by blocking entire streets and clashing violently with police. The police
responded with tear gas and their own violence, ultimately arresting at least 211 people.
Many were members of La Otra who had come to support the worker movement’s cause.
Two individuals, 14-year-old Francisco Javier Cortés Santiago and 19-year-old Alexis
Benhumea Hernández, were killed during the incident. Witnesses say Cortés was shot and
killed by a police officer, while Hernández reportedly died after sustaining head injuries
from a tear gas grenade fired by police (“Mexico: Violence Against Women” 2006, 2-3).
The police drove most of those arrested to state prison, during which time they sexually
abused and raped many of the women (3). Most of those arrested were later released,
but 27 remained imprisoned on charges of obstructing the highway and kidnapping police
officers. Eight officers had been kidnapped during the initial confrontation, but were found
unharmed the next day.
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to suspend the caravan until all those imprisoned were freed.21 The
release of these prisoners, as well as other political detainees in
Mexico, has grown into a chief organizing effort of La Otra’s urban
movements in Mexico City.
The final section of La Sexta seeks to connect La Otra to other
movements of its kind around the globe:
In the world…
1. We will build more relationships of respect and mutual aid with
people and organizations that resist and fight against
neoliberalism and for humankind.
2. In accordance with our abilities we will send material support
such as food and crafts to those brothers and sisters who struggle
throughout the world …
3. And to everyone throughout the world who resists we say that
there have to be other intercontinental gatherings … this is about
making horizontal agreements among us all. But we don’t want it
with a stage from where just a few speak and everyone else
listens, but, rather, that there not be a stage, that it all be at
ground-level, but well ordered because if not well organized there
will just be a lot of noise and no one will understand the word. And
with a good organization, everyone can listen, and they can write
down in their notebooks the words of resistance that others tell so
that later each participant can talk it over with their colleagues in
their worlds. (EZLN 2005, 4-5)

Since June of 2005, the Zapatistas have held several international
conferences, including the “Encuentro Intergaláctico”
(Intergalactic Meeting) in December of 2006 and the “Encuentro
Continental Americano contra la Impunidad” (Continental
American Meeting Against Impunity) in the summer of 2009. Both
were held in Chiapas and drew audiences from over 30 countries.
21

La Otra’s tour through Mexico continued in 2007, this time covering all of Mexico.
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In summary, La Sexta document provides both the
ideological basis for La Otra Campaña and its preliminary proposal
for the formation of a broad network of anti-capitalist and leftist
organizations. As the founding document of La Otra, La Sexta
served as a way to begin the national discussion, not to impose it
according to a Zapatista ideology. La Sexta, therefore, does not
offer a precise blueprint for the form that this coalition will ultimately
take. Moreover, nothing implicitly states nor suggests how these
various movements should go about organizing.
We don’t come to you to tell you what you should do nor to give
you orders. … Nor are we going to tell you to do what we do, nor
that you should rise up in arms. What we are going to do is ask you
how your lives are going, your struggles, your thoughts about how
our country is doing and about what we can do so that they don’t
defeat us. … And maybe together, we will come up with a plan
about how we will continue with this program that includes what
we all want, and a plan for how we are going to achieve this
program, that is named ‘the national plan for struggle.’ (EZLN 2005,
2-3)

Thus, rather than arrogate a master plan for Mexico to follow, La
Sexta acts as a starting point.
Zapatismo offers vital lessons for other social movements
within La Otra seeking autonomy. In the remainder of this paper, I
will discuss three distinct movements within La Otra. First, I will look at
the dynamics of one of the Zapatista autonomous communities,
Oventic. From an outsider’s perspective, La Otra often speaks in
generalities. Self-characterized as anti-political, it proclaims its
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ultimate goal as one for achieving “absolute autonomy,” that is, a
de-legitimization of state power, along with a permanent
politicization of the populace. In the next section, I will analyze what
the Zapatistas actually mean by this. Doing so will help us transition
into the subsequent part of this paper, which will have two main
focuses: (1) a discussion of how two non-indigenous organizations
within La Otra have articulated the lessons of Zapatista autonomy in
their own projects of self-government and (2) a critique of the
strengths and weaknesses of the social coalitions built with these
two movements.

IV. Lessons from Zapatista Autonomy
During a morning class inside the autonomous Zapatista community
of Oventic, one of the Zapatista teachers, dressed in the traditional
hand-knit skirt and red-striped blouse worn by the women of her
Tzotzil tribe, took out a piece of paper and with her pencil drew
over it a large circle. Around the circle she wrote the words,
despojo, explotación, represión, and discriminación,22 which
translate literally as robbery (of one’s land), exploitation, repression,
and discrimination. “These are the four things that drive the

22

All Zapatista “promoters” are fluent in Spanish—a by-product of bilingual schooling in
Oventic.
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capitalistic system,” Nubia23 said. Under such a system, she
explained, all work simultaneously together, and one doesn’t
function without the others. “Here,” she said, referring to Oventic,
“there is no system. The system is inside each one of you. It’s not in
the United States or Europe. It lives in each one of you” (personal
correspondence 2009). Nubia was just 8-years-old when her family
joined with the EZLN to fight in the Zapatista rebellion. Now she is a
“promoter,” the term used to describe Zapatista teachers,24 for
foreigners visiting Oventic. In an effort to build solidarity, she teaches
them about the Zapatista struggle.
Oventic is located in the highlands of Chiapas about an hour
outside San Cristóbal de Las Casas. Arriving there often proves a
challenge, since not all taxi drivers are familiar with the location,25
and colectivos leave only sparingly from San Cristóbal. The trip itself
involves an hour drive through the mountains on windy, bumpy, and
mostly dirt roads. When one reaches the community, one sees a
sign that reads, “You are now entering autonomous, rebel territory.”

23

Zapatista names have been changed in order to protect individual identities.
Zapatistas say the term “teacher” implies an unequal relationship between teacher and
pupil, one in which the teacher knows more than his student. As one promoter told me, “I
don’t want to say that we [teachers] know more. We are equal” (personal
correspondence 2009). Zapatista promoters are young, typically no older than 30. “In
order to be named an education, health, communication, or agroecological promoter,
an individual must fulfill a number of requirements, among them moral irreproachability,
availability, a political background, and the ability to communicate efficiently in two or
more languages” (Baronnet 2008, 117).
25
However, this is changing quickly as more tourists come to visit Oventic. During my stay,
tourists visited every day.

24
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Entering the gated community takes time. Zapatistas guarding the
entrance check passports and then escort visitors to meet with
three other Zapatistas inside a small wood building, who ask basic
questions about your intentions for visiting, your knowledge about
the Zapatista movement, etc. The Zapatistas claim such steps are
taken to prevent against infiltration from government spies,
particularly paramilitary groups. The Center for Political Analysis and
Social and Economic Investigation (CAPISE), based in San Cristóbal,
reports that since 2007 paramilitary aggressions have affected 800
families and threatened takeover of over 12,000 hectares of
Zapatista-controlled land. “The Mexican state has reactivated
paramilitary groups,” says CAPISE director Ernesto Ledesma. “They
are dispossessing the indigenous peoples once again from their
lands, from their territory” (Gibler 2009, 215). During my three-week
stay in Oventic, I was prohibited from entering the forests unless
accompanied by a Zapatista. That’s because orejas (ears)—the
word used by Zapatistas to describe spies—patrol the mountains
surrounding Oventic, Nubia says. Paramilitary soldiers include some
former Zapatistas, bought off or coerced into changing sides. In
addition to paramilitaries, the Mexican army maintains 79 military
bases throughout Chiapas, including 56 in Zapatista territory (216); I
passed one on my way from San Cristóbal to Oventic. As recently
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as January 2010, federal and state authorities burned homes and
removed families from two indigenous communities in the Montes
Azules region of the Lacandona Jungle. Other communities are also
at risk of dislocation from this area, where local powerbrokers have
plans to construct eco-tourist facilities (“Mexican News Analysis”
2010).
All Zapatista guards wear ski masks. In a 1995 interview,
Marcos defended their use: “I will take off my ski mask when
Mexican society takes off its own mask, the one it uses to cover up
the real Mexico. … And once they [Mexicans] have seen the real
Mexico—as we have seen it—they will be more determined to
change it” (Benjamin 1995, 70). Aside from concealing one’s
identity, the ski mask serves as an important symbol of the Zapatista
movement.

Figure 1. Photo of the Zapatista Caracol Oventic
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Source: Williams 2009
Figure 2. Office of the Good Government Council in Oventic

Source: Williams 2009
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Over the years, the Indian rebel hiding behind a ski mask has
become a major popular icon, emblematic of Zapatista resistance.
Ironically, the anti-neoliberal Zapatistas have capitalized on
globalization, commodifying their image through the production of
merchandise, including ski masks, t-shirts, buttons, refrigerator
magnets, posters, and key chains, to name a few items (McCowan
2003, 29). As McCowan postulates: “Like the tourist destination that
markets itself to the expectations and preconceived
understandings of the tourist, the popular culture industry has
created and designed the essential and authentic Zapatista for
consumption in the public mind” (2003, 32).
Oventic is one of the five Caracoles (conches)26 established
in 2003 when the EZLN began a new phase in its struggle with the
creation of autonomous municipalities and new forms of selfgovernment. The move separated the EZLN leadership from
Zapatista civil society, taking away its decision-making capacity
within the communities. Marcos explains the change:
The military structure of the EZLN “contaminated” in some ways a
democratic and self-governing tradition. The EZLN, was, shall we
say, one of the “antidemocratic” elements in a relation of direct
community democracy. … Since the EZLN, on principle, is not
fighting to take power, none of the military leadership … can

26

The Caracol is “a large and cavernous seashell, pointed and spiral, which can amplify
sounds—both what one hears and what one emits. The indigenous peoples of Chiapas,
writes Subcomandante Marcos, ‘held the figure of the conch in great esteem.’ It was, for
them, a symbol of knowledge and of life. They used it ‘to summon the community’ and as
‘an aid to hear the most distant words’” (González Casanova 2005, 1).
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occupy positions of authority in the community or in the
autonomous municipalities. (Stahler-Sholk 2007, 58)

There are currently 38 “Autonomous Rebel Zapatista Councils”
throughout Chiapas. These autonomous spaces cover almost 40
percent of the state’s territory and include approximately 1,100
communities of 300 to 400 inhabitants each (Dinerstein 2009, 6).27
Depending on proximity, each of these communities corresponds to
one of the five Caracoles, all of which have their own Good
Government Council (GGC).

Figure 3. Map of EZLN Caracoles in Chiapas.

27

These communities are not legally recognized as autonomous by the Mexican state.
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Source: Dinerstein 2009, 7.

Decision-making is divided into three levels: (1) At the local level,
communities in each town elect authorities called communal
agents, as well as representatives to the Autonomous Councils, the
decision making body; (2) at the municipal level, delegates from
each town meet in frequent assemblies to discuss important issues
and community projects. Representatives to the GGCs and
permanent representatives to the Caracoles are also elected; (3)
the state level comprises the five Caracoles: Oventic, Roberto
Barrios, Morelia, La Realidad, and La Garrucha. Two representatives
from each local autonomous council participate in these regional
GGCs, in charge of
administering justice, mediating conflicts between autonomous
councils and government councils, issuing identity cards,
discussing goals related to welfare provision (health, education),
promoting and supervising projects and community programs,
denouncing violations to human rights, and guaranteeing bicultural education and health. (Dinerstein 2009, 7)28

What does “autonomy” look like in a typical Zapatista
community? The GGC of Oventic has 23 members who hold
monthly meetings, in addition to occasional ad hoc gatherings.

28

These descriptions serve as general guidelines for Zapatista self-government. They are by
no means the limit or the rule. No two Zapatista villages are expected to govern in the
exact same way.
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Representatives stay in their posts for short periods of time,
approximately two weeks. There is no formal division of power and,
as just explained, anyone, regardless of gender, can be elected to
these posts. Thus, by rotating positions frequently and enabling all
individuals to participate, the practice of democracy becomes
direct rather than representative. In a nutshell, autonomy means
that communities organized with horizontal relations of power
assume responsibility for the decisions that affect their lives. Para
todos todo, para nosotros nada—for everyone everything, nothing
for us—signifies that wealth and power are distributed equally within
society and that work is done for the collective good, not for selfgain. Zapatista communities do not have salaries. In theory, all
positions are done in service to the larger community. The downside
to this type of structure, of course, is its proclivity for inefficiency. The
Zapatistas understand this, but insist that such a model remains the
best way for their communities to ensure accountability and avoid
non-hierarchical decision-making. They do not suggest, however,
that other communities seeking self-governance, including those
within La Otra, follow this same system. As Nubia told me, “We don’t
try to impose our ideas on other places. We understand that
democracy means distinct things in different places” (personal
correspondence 2009). Put differently, the type and form of
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democracy ultimately practiced depends on the social conditions
and historic cultural processes characteristic of each community. In
the Zapatista case, democracy is modeled after the collective
communities that already exist and on direct democratic
procedures that have been in place for centuries— if not always in
practice, at least in theory. In contrast, the two social movements
that I will analyze in the next section share neither of these
characteristics. Not surprisingly, then, democracy has taken
different shapes in Tlaxcala and Mexico City. The underlying
principles and goals associated with the Zapatismo lexicon—desde
abajo, mandar obedeciendo, and para todos todo, para nosotros
nada—remain, but, as we will see, they reveal themselves through
diverse channels and structures, depending on particular social,
economic, political, and cultural contexts.
In Oventic, the people have cut themselves off from
governmental aid, including the Oportunidades29 social welfare
program, have built their own primary and secondary schools and
hospital, and have developed economic alternatives to capitalism,
such as boot-making and textile-weaving cooperatives. Zapatista
29

Oportunidades (formerly Progreso) was established in 1997 to provide financial
assistance to Mexicans, particularly women, living under conditions of extreme poverty. It
imposes a western ideology, thus mirroring the poverty reduction programs practiced by
international development agencies. For example, human freedom is associated with the
attainment of capital. The program is “divorced from any resource distribution initiatives
and even more so from any analysis of the persistence of structural inequalities” (Mora
2007, 68-69).
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cooperatives, of course, do not fully escape capitalistic conditions.
Profit is still made off customers, mostly foreign tourists, who buy
Zapatista products. The difference, though, is that the middlemen
are eliminated and profits are shared collectively within the
community—not pocketed by the capitalist. In Oventic, for
example, the money (i.e., the surplus value) generated from the
artisan cooperative Mujeres por la Dignidad Rebelde, which has
stores in Oventic and San Cristóbal, is used to help offset the costs
of the school and hospital. Not surprisingly, funding remains one of
the main problems confronting the Zapatistas. Like most Zapatista
communities, Oventic depends on international solidarity (e.g., the
Mexico Solidarity Network) for the funding of its projects. Beginning
in 2003, the GGCs began reviewing NGO programs to make sure
that the Zapatistas, not the NGOs, were driving the development
process:
There is a more sophisticated kind of handout which is practiced
by some NGOs and international organizations. It consists more or
less in their deciding what the communities need and, without
even consulting them, imposing not just particular projects but also
the timing and form of their execution. Imagine the desperation of
a community that needs potable water and instead is given a
library or needs a school for children and is given a course on
herbiculture. (Marcos 2003)

In some instances, the Zapatistas charge a 10 percent tax to NGOs
with projects in specific communities, helping to “counterbalance
the uneven development that reflected the convenience and
preferences of NGO funders, reaffirming the concept of community
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empowerment” and to “escape from the autonomy without
resources trap” (Stahler-Sholk 2007, 57).30 In a few Zapatista villages,
NGOs, using fair-trade practices, have assisted in linking coffee and
honey cooperatives with export markets (Nash 2008, 15).
Ironically, people in Oventic drink Coca-Cola. Apparent
inconsistencies like this in a movement so profoundly anti-capitalist
are worth examining. Are not the Zapatistas contradicting
themselves by commercializing their image via the Internet and
selling their products to national and international markets? The
answer is twofold. On the one hand, yes, the Zapatistas are
undeniably engaging and benefiting off capitalistic relations. They
do so, however, not with capitalism’s primary goal—the
accumulation of wealth—in mind. Remember, we are still talking
about impoverished communities without access to clean drinking
water and sewage systems. The economic base of highland
Chiapas, concentrated on milpa (small plot) farming of corn, cattle
herding, and coffee “can scarcely guarantee subsistence, let alone
generate enough cash to stabilize subsistence production” (Nash
2008, 15). Furthermore, the vast majority of production is created for
use, not exchange, value. The vegetables and fruit grown in the

30

The “autonomy without resources trap” is the assumption that because an autonomous
community becomes self-sufficient (i.e., cutting itself off from state aid and services), that it
will, over time, struggle to provide enough resources for its population.
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Oventic garden rarely leave Oventic; instead, they are used for selfconsumption or consumption of the family or extended community.
If people in Oventic do want to buy or trade produce, they can
travel to small Zapatista markets, located about 15 minutes away, in
San Andrés. As demonstrated by the example of the Oventic
artisan cooperative, the money left over from sales at Zapatista
cooperatives goes towards education, healthcare, and other
autonomous projects. Along these lines, Coca-Cola has a high usevalue as a source of caffeine, calories, and clean drinking water. In
a region where clean water is sparse, Coke is both accessible and
inexpensive. It is bought collectively at wholesale prices and then
sold exclusively at Zapatista-run grocery cooperatives. The
Zapatistas say that someday they will produce Coke under noncapitalist conditions, but until that day, they will continue to
consume Coke.
Interestingly, Oventic does rely on the government for
electricity, but like over 70 percent of the Chiapan population with
electricity, they don’t pay for it—not at the current prices offered.
Although Chiapas produces over 50 percent of Mexico’s
hydroelectric power and 20 percent of the country’s total
electricity, one-third of the state’s population lives without
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electricity, including the majority of Zapatista communities (Hansen,
personal correspondence 2010).31
Education is central to the construction of Zapatista
autonomy. Both Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire32 and Gramsci
point to the importance of popular education as a way of
confronting hegemony. Zapatista education resembles the model
emphasized by Freire, in which learning allows for dialogic
discussion based on mutual respect. Reflection is used as a means
of arriving to new realities. Instead of passively listening, students are
converted into active participants in the educational process and
knowledge becomes meaningful to their everyday lives. Freire
wrote that in the absence of such meaning, a false consciousness is
created, inhibiting one’s ability to act and change one’s reality.

31

Since 2000, energy prices in Mexico have increased by 54 percent. In Chiapas, citizens
have accrued a combined 300 million pesos (approximately $24.6 million USD) in debt, as
a result of loans taken out to afford electricity from 1994 to 2009 (Pérez Silva 2009). In
response to high costs, many Mexicans, especially in Chiapas, have protested against the
Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE) by organizing marches, blocking highways, and
refusing to pay their energy bills. In some instances, the CFE has responded by cutting off
the electricity of those who don’t pay. In others, like Oventic, people remain with
electricity—at least for now (Rodriguez 2009). It will be interesting to see how this energy
crisis plays out. In November of 2009, Chiapa’s governor, Juan Sabines Guerrero, promised
to cut the energy bill by 50 percent for 40 municipalities of Chiapas living under conditions
of “high marginalization.” He also said the government and CFE would “cover the historic
debt” left by the high energy prices (Pérez Silva 2009). It is unclear, though, whether such
concessions will apply to Zapatista communities.
32

Freire, author of the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, designed literary programs for poor
non-literate Brazilians before the military coup of April 1, 1964, ultimately leading to his exile
from Brazil. These programs ran counter to the traditional educational models practiced in
Brazil, which, according to Freire, were so “disconnected from life, centered on words
emptied of the reality they are meant to represent, lacking in concrete activity” that they
“could never develop a critical consciousness. Indeed, its own naïve dependence on
high-sounding phrases, reliance on rote, and tendency toward abstractness actually
intensified our naiveté” (Freire 2008, 33).
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Practiced like this, education turns into a vehicle to liberate oneself
from oppression.
The secondary school in Oventic, with approximately 120
students and 24 promoters,33 strives to instill the “critical
consciousness”—the “things and facts as they exist empirically, in
their causal and circumstantial correlations”—absent from the state
schools (Freire 2008, 39). “What [the state schools] imposed on us
was the other history” (Nubia, personal correspondence 2009).
According to the coordinator of the education center in Francisco
Villa, an autonomous

Figure 4: Zapatista Classroom at Oventic Secondary School

33

Students and promoters are housed within Oventic during the school year. Oventic is
currently the only Zapatista secondary school, which is our equivalent of a middle school.
There are many Zapatista primary schools.
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Source: Williams 2009

municipality in the Lacandona Jungle, the goal of Zapatista
promoters is to “open the eyes of our children.” He explains:
Our elders like it because we are reviving the culture; we are
reconstructing that which was lost. The people do not want to lose
their traditions, their language. … We teach many things about the
beginning of the struggle, because the struggle is not something
new: it goes back 500 years, and we are looking into the reasons
for this suffering, since we don’t want it to happen again. …
Children should know all kinds of things so that they are aware of
how things used to be. (Baronnet 2008, 117)

The Oventic school is bilingual and bicultural. Subjects include
social studies, science, math, humanism, indigenous language, and
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Spanish.34 History is taught from the perspective of the Zapatistas,
not from that of the “imaginary Mexico” Nubia alludes to. The
school day lasts from 8 until 2 p.m. At 4 o’clock there is usually an
additional activity, such as dance class or basketball, and the
evenings are left free for homework. When foreigners are taking
classes, activities are specially designed so that Zapatista students
and visitors can work together on a project. Facilities include
standard classrooms with desks and chalkboards, as well as a library
for research and reading. Student progress is assessed through
evaluations, but grades are not issued as they are in American
classrooms. Apart from studying, students are responsible for helping
to run the school. For example, groups of students alternate
between cooking meals and cleaning classrooms and bathrooms.
The federal government does not recognize or accredit Zapatista
schools, so students forfeit their chances at high school or university
educations.35 Long-term plans to construct a Zapatista high school

34

“Humanism” is a class on Zapatista history and current events. Aside from indigenous
language study, all classes in the secondary school are conducted in the Spanish
language. The only exception is for first-year students, where some flexibility will be given to
students who do not yet have command of Spanish. In this case, the native languages,
usually Tzotzil or Tzeltal, will also be used within the classroom.
35
The one exception to this is an indigenous university located in an isolated neighborhood
of San Cristóbal. The university, unaffiliated with the state, is funded by the Catholic
Church. Its resources and facilities, including cabin dorms, furnished classrooms, an
extensive library, and bathrooms with sewage systems, are impressive, to say the least.
Classes on virtually all topics, from music to politics, are offered. Unfortunately, I discovered
the university during my final days in Chiapas, and therefore did not have the opportunity
to conduct thorough research or interviews. According to Hansen, only a few Zapatistas
from the Oventic Secondary School have attended the university, most choosing to take
jobs in their local communities instead.
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and university remain in the preliminary stages of discussion, still far
from being realized.
Upon completing their secondary education, students
typically find jobs serving the Zapatista communities in education,
health, ecology, and so forth. Obviously, these jobs are limited in
scope and depend upon the capacities and needs of the
Zapatista villages. Ultimately, though, this is the price of autonomous
education done in defiance of the state. Like other social
movements, the Zapatistas have made concerted efforts to
develop their knowledge base by inviting experts from various
academic fields into their communities. In Oventic, an Italian doctor
spends six months each year training prospective Zapatista doctors
in Western medicine and medical procedures. University professors
from Mexico City travel to Oventic to offer pedagogical workshops
for young promoters, and two university educated men live year
round in Oventic; one serves as a librarian, and the other as a
Spanish language instructor for the promoters. In the Zapatista
autonomous municipality of Libertad de los Pueblos Mayas, located
in the Lacandona Jungle, community members receive training in
agroecology from an NGO in San Cristóbal; NGOs have also come
to the community to offer workshops on sustainable agriculture
(Baronnet 2008, 117). Despite these examples, it is clear that
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Zapatista villages are struggling to extend their knowledge base
beyond simple literacy and mathematics. In Oventic, it is a
legitimate concern that students cannot study beyond the U.S.
equivalent of eighth grade. The clinic, while a positive step, still lacks
the resources and knowledge necessary to train doctors as
specialists and to deal with serious illnesses. These potential pitfalls
will need to be addressed at some point in the future.
Zapatista schools are clearly linked to the “Indianization” of
the communities—the rescuing of cultural traditions and the
valorization of indigenous identity. At the same time, schools serve
to reject some of the cultural injustices built into that tradition.
Nubia, for example, grew up watching discrimination against
indigenous women. Her mother never went to school. Like countless
other indigenous women, she existed only to bear children, cook
meals, and serve her husband. The Zapatistas attempted to change
that by enacting the Women’s Revolutionary Law36 in 1992. Nubia
later became the first woman in her family to attend school. By
traditional Mayan standards, Nubia, now 23, would have been
married off in her early teens. “Now why would I want to get
married?” she asks. “I’m not even sure I want children” (personal
36

“This law enumerates women’s right to employment, education, wages, healthcare and
basic services, as well as recognizing women’s capacity for political work and leadership,
both in the community and in the insurgent movement, and also as part of the rebel
organization. Very clearly it pointed out the sphere of women’s self-determination
regarding marriage and motherhood” (Millán 2005, 3).

59
correspondence 2009). Today, 40 percent of the active participants
in the EZLN are women, and in Zapatista national appearances,
men and women are always equally represented (Nash 2008, 1314). Within the Zapatista communities and EZLN, many women hold
the same posts as men, including comandanta, the highest rank in
the army, and they serve on the GGCs. In schools, the law has
helped raise the percentage of girl students to equal that of boys.
The law also banned alcohol, which was identified as a leading
cause for male physical violence towards women. The Zapatistas
admit, however, that they still have a long way to go towards fully
overcoming sexism and deeply embedded traditions that excluded
women from local councils.37 Still, the empowerment of women is
one of the more egalitarian and appealing elements of the
Zapatista movement. In challenging the imbedded machista
features of both the indigenous and dominant multiculturalist
ideologies, Zapatista women are helping to destabilize the
gendered ordering of Mexican society.
In summary, the Zapatista practices of indigenous autonomy
offer important alternatives to the cultural and economic logics of
assimilationalist and neoliberal projects of the Mexican elite. Overall,

37

According to Nash, Zapatista women still suffer physical and sexual abuse. One woman
was killed by her husband after attending a community meeting. Some villages have lifted
the ban on alcohol, leading to more incidents of wife and child abuse (2008, 14).
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their emphases on self-government, community, participatory
education, and women’s rights foster the construction of a critical
consciousness within the movement’s participants. In their analysis
of protest movements in the U.S. during and after the Great
Depression, Piven and Cloward identify three ways in which
consciousness is developed:
First, “the system,’’—or those aspects of the system that people
experience and perceive—loses legitimacy. Large numbers of
men and women who ordinarily accept the authority of their rulers
and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements come to believe
in some measure that these rulers and these arrangements are
unjust and wrong. Second, people who are ordinarily fatalistic,
who believe existing arrangements are inevitable begin to assert
“rights” that imply demands for change. Third, there is a new sense
of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless
come to believe that they have some capacity to change their
lot. (1979, 4)

In Mexico, we have seen all three of these elements play out within
the Zapatista movement. Among Zapatistas, the Mexican
government has lost all legitimacy at the federal, state, and local
levels. Over time, the Zapatistas, after being denied certain rights,
have cut ties with the state and self-implemented territorial and
cultural autonomy. All along, the self-efficacy of the Zapatistas has
gone fortifying itself. Piven and Cloward posit that along with a
transformation of consciousness comes a change in behavior. This
behavior most often takes the form of defiance, in which people
“violate the traditions and laws to which they ordinarily acquiesce,
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and they flaunt the authorities to whom they ordinarily defer. …
Their defiance is acted out collectively, as members of a group,
and not as isolated individuals” (1979, 4) In essence, Piven and
Cloward are describing the Freirian concept that knowledge (more
precisely, the formation of a critical consciousness) leads to direct
action. And in the Zapatista communities, this theory has been put
into practice. Through education, community members, especially
youth, are becoming aware of their own realities. That is, they are
beginning to grasp the political, economic, and social constructs
that generate poverty and inequality. Greater knowledge and
understanding of the Zapatista struggle strengthens the broader
movement because it builds collective identity and empowers and
encourages the masses to join together in popular resistance. In
short, knowledge becomes power. La Otra hopes to apply and
extend the lessons of Zapatista autonomy to a national scale. As
Mora suggests, La Otra “represents an opportunity to draw from
multiple forms of cultural knowledge and experiences of historically
marginalized political actors in constructing anticapitalist
alternatives that transform the hierarchical positioning of ethnicracialized groups in society” (2007, 65).
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V. Towards Autonomy and a National Coalition
Zapatismo is not a dogma. It’s not a religion. What we have
learned from La Otra is that Zapatismo is not only this world in
which many worlds fit, but also the form in which you develop
these worlds. We cannot make a copy of what is happening in
Chiapas because the conditions are different. Zapatismo has
planted precisely this, that we’re not a dogma, but a reality that
builds itself from the conscience of the people.
—Luz Rivera, leader of Tlaxcala’s Consejo Nacional
Urbana y Campesina

On a late summer morning in July, I sat talking with Luz Rivera inside
the Tlaxcala city office of the Consejo Nacional Urbana Campesina
(CNUC), a community-based movement that addresses the needs
of local campesino families. Quite unexpectedly, a young man,
about 25 years old, walked into the room, accompanied by
another member of the CNUC’s staff. Luz didn’t recognize him.
Judging by the look on his face, though, something was definitely
wrong. “It’s my friend,” he told Luz. “He’s been in the hospital for
two weeks, and the doctors have done nothing.” As the man
shared the rest of his story—how his friend had injured his arm in a
car accident, then had been sent to the hospital where he’d gone
untreated for two weeks—Luz nodded, seemingly not the least bit
surprised. She swore under her breath several times over, “Pinche
gobierno,” with emphasis on the pinche, (translated as “damn
government”). The wound was deep enough to see the bone, and
yet the hospital hadn’t even taken an x-ray, the man said. Five
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minutes later, Luz was on the phone with a nurse from the hospital.
She got straight to the point: “If this man doesn’t have surgery, he
will lose his arm, and that’s the hospital’s fault.” “We don’t have the
facilities or equipment to perform the surgery,” the nurse explained.
“Then get him to a hospital that does,” Luz demanded (personal
correspondence 2009). Afterwards, Luz called Tlaxcala’s Secretary
of Health. Sure enough, later that day, the patient was on his way to
Mexico City (about a 2-hour drive west from Tlaxcala) for surgery.
These are the types of issues that Luz, the leader of the CNUC
for almost 20 years, deals with on a daily basis. The CNUC is a
community organization based out of Tlaxcala, the smallest state in
the republic of Mexico; it works closely with campesino communities
throughout the state to help provide such basic necessities as clean
running water, housing, and milk. In addition, the CNUC puts
pressure on the government for better streets and schools,
improved healthcare, childcare centers, and funding for the
construction of community centers. In terms of structure, the CNUC
has a statewide committee, housed in the Tlaxcala city office, with
five permanent staff members. The 25 communities associated with
the CNUC in Tlaxcala each has its own representative responsible
for attending a weekly meeting in Tlaxcala and then reporting back
to their local community assemblies on the items discussed.
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The CNUC formed in 1992 out of a rupture in the political
party, the PRT (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores), which was
bought off by politicians from President Salinas’ camp seeking
support for the reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. Far
from achieving so-called “liberty and justice for the countryside,” as
initially promised, the reform’s privatization of ejido lands and the
elimination of land redistribution had quite the opposite effect. It
paved the way for the signing of NAFTA in 1994, threatening and, in
some cases, destroying subsistence agriculture in Mexico’s peasantdriven areas, including in Tlaxcala, where campesinos had been
dependent on subsidies and state-financed credit dating back to
the 1930s. As a woman from Toluca de Guadalupe, one of the
largest communities within the CNUC, notes:
We have been affected a lot because our seed is not worth
anything. It does not have the value that it did before. For
example, when I was left a widow with my (nine) young children,
the corn was my principal (economic) base because I sold corn
and got back beans, soap, sugar, and all that. And now to get a
kilo of beans you need to sell 20 kilos of corn. Now it is not enough.
… We on this side cannot compete with the United States. It is very
difficult for us because we do not have subsidies. We do not have
the ability to buy machinery. … For this, I say that the Free Trade
Agreement is what destroyed our structures of life. (Duffly & Ferrara
2006)

Figure 5. Photo of Tlaxcala Plantations

65

Source: Williams 2009

In accordance with the 1992 reform, Salinas implemented a
program through which campesinos could obtain individual
certificates of their land rights if they signed up for the government’s
PROCEDE plan. The legislation’s vague language stated: “The
decision to participate in the certification program may or may not
lead to a future decision to privatize or disband the ejido” (Assies
2008, 51). In reality, PROCEDE both encouraged and facilitated the
sale of communal land into private hands. While many poor
campesinos have since joined the program out of financial
necessity, the CNUC’s members have continued to resist. “The
organization (the CNUC) has helped us defend ourselves, in not
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giving ourselves up and letting them (the state and its politicians)
take land from us … [it] taught us that we have to defend the land.
It is our principal base. It is the only patrimony that we have, the
land” (Duffly & Ferrara 2006). The CNUC’s push for governmental
subsidies, particularly for fertilizer, has enabled many campesinos to
maintain their farms. This is true in San Simeon, where all the town’s
land remains under the ownership of a single ejido.
But the CNUC’s support alone has not been enough to ward
off other consequences of neoliberalism. People in Tlaxcala refer to
San Simeon as “un pueblito de fantasmas”—a ghost town. Beautiful
new houses line the streets, but no one lives in them. That’s because
more than half the town has migrated north to the U.S. Most of
those left are children and grandparents. During my week-stay in
San Simeon, I lived with an elderly couple whose seven children
have all migrated north. I taught English to their eight-year-old
granddaughter, Yusalin, a shy girl whose single mom works seven
months of the year in Idaho as a hotel clerk. All CNUC communities
struggle with the issue of migration, and while San Simeon is the
most extreme case, there is worry that similar depopulation patterns
could soon befall other communities.

67
Figure 6. Photo of Campesino House in San Simeon, Tlaxcala

Source: Williams 2009

The CNUC defines its politics as anti-capitalist and antielectoral. Tlaxcaltecan politics are corrupt at the state and local
levels. One day, inside the State Congress building in Tlaxcala, I
asked a librarian named Paola about the upcoming elections for
the state’s five federal diplomats, which were to take place that
weekend. Despite being a government employee, Paola criticized
the political parties openly and relentlessly, saying that she
expected the PAN to win, even if the votes didn’t add up. The PAN
pays $3,000 pesos per vote, she told me. “The PAN are elitist. For
them, women are less” (personal correspondence 2009). That
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weekend the PRI—not the PAN as she had predicted—swept the
competition. No one involved with the CNUC voted. Corruption is
equally as problematic in the local governments. According to a
man in San Simeon (unaffiliated with the CNUC because he says
they cause too much trouble), the local mayor pockets all the
money he receives from the state. He signs off that a road has been
paved, when it hasn’t been. When parents asked him to replace
the broken basketball hoops, the mayor told them: “Send me a
memo.” And he did nothing. “After the elections, there is no one
left,” Luz says, referring to the politicians who break their promises to
the people who vote for them. “But CNUC is still there” (personal
correspondence 2009).
The CNUC practices autonomy differently from the Zapatistas.
Whereas the Zapatistas have virtually cut themselves off from the
state, the CNUC still relies on the government for funding and
resources. In addition, no autonomous schools or hospitals have yet
been built in Tlaxcala. In fact, as demonstrated by the earlier
example of the man involved in the car accident, the CNUC, rather
than separate itself from the government, makes demands on its
institutions and leaders. Around Tlaxcala, the CNUC has a
reputation for being a militant group. “Somos muy peleaneros,” Luz
told me that day in her office (this roughly translated as “we like to
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fight”). What exactly does this mean? Basically, that the CNUC
pressures the government into giving it what it wants, when it wants.
In other words, it causes disruption, often by organizing protests and
marches. Its most effective technique, though, is the occupation of
public offices, for which several of the CNUC’s members have been
arrested over the years. “We don’t want to go to the meetings of
the political parties to fight,” Rivera says. “No, we go to the towns
themselves, to fight against the local bosses and mayors, to fight for
the freedom of our people. … If you don’t confront the government
directly, they’re going to kill you” (personal correspondence 2009).
The CNUC mobilizes around a wide range of issues. In
Hueyotlípan, after two children were hit by cars and killed on the
town’s main road a few years ago, CNUC organizers met with the
mayor and convinced him to provide materials so they could build
speed bumps for the road. When the police came in and removed
the speed bumps, CNUC members constructed new ones, which
remain in place today. In Nanacamilpa, which began organizing
through the CNUC about a year and a half ago, the CNUC has
helped improve the response time of local ambulances, making
sure they arrive promptly at the front door of the sick, rather than an
hour and a half late in a distant location. At one of the weekly
meetings in Tlaxcala, the CNUC invited the state’s assistant to the
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Secretary of Education to talk with the organization’s parents. The
parents vented for an hour about the problems with the state’s
public school system. Many asked, “Why do we have to pay for
books and uniforms, when the law says school is free?”38 In at least
three schools, the CNUC has secured funds from the government to
help pay for uniforms, which are required attire in most Tlaxcala
public schools.
The CNUC’s relations with the Zapatistas began almost
immediately following the 1994 uprising, when they declared
themselves in solidarity with the movement. Over the years, the
CNUC has participated in several events hosted by the Zapatistas,
including 1996’s Inter-Continental Encounter against Neoliberalism
and for Humanity.39 Luz calls the Zapatistas “the example” for other
social movements seeking autonomy and radical change in
Mexico. She says the CNUC still lacks the “conscience” of the
Zapatistas. Maria Luisa, the CNUC representative for Hueyotlípan,
attended the ceremony for the opening of the Zapatista
Caracoles, held in Oventic in 2003:
After going to the Zapatista communities, I have learned that it’s
not what the television says. The Zapatistas have given us
examples of dignity that perhaps we still don’t have. I have
realized that sometimes when you say that this isn’t going to
38

Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 establishes that education in Mexico is to be
free, lay, and universal (Lorey 1995, 1).
39
In this meeting, leftists, anarchists, indigenous peoples, peasant organizations,
environmentalists, intellectuals, gays, NGOs, and feminists from six continents, joined
together for the first global gathering of the “new-resistance” (Rosset 2005, 36).
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change because it’s too difficult, sometimes it isn’t that difficult.
When you go to the Zapatista communities, you realize that there
really can be a great change, that yes there can be another way
to organize yourselves, another system in which there are no
political parties. … If in the Zapatista communities this form has
worked it’s because they haven’t been mistaken. They are the
example for what we have to do to change this whole system.
(personal correspondence 2009)

For the CNUC, this consciousness-raising starts and ends with
education. As Luisa’s husband and CNUC staff member, Alejo, puts
it: “If you have an education you’re going to be free. You’re going
to think. And this is what the Mexican government, the capitalistic
system, the bureaucracy, and those on top don’t want. They want
people that they can drive, manipulate, and impose [on]”
(personal correspondence 2009). In Hueyotlípan, the CNUC helped
fund the construction of a community center where the town’s
residents now take classes, free of charge, in areas such as music,
dance, and other special topics. In one session, Gabriel, a U.S.
college student volunteering with the CNUC, taught a class on
immigration rights in the U.S., specifically for those living without
documents. “The rights of immigrants were something I didn’t know
before,” Luisa says. “Now with this class, I know how to orient
someone in my family or out of my family if they have problems,
where they can ask or what they can do” (personal
correspondence 2009). Everyone in attendance had at least one
family-member in the U.S. Gabriel taught them that the only
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question an immigrant must legally answer, when stopped by a
police officer, is his or her name. He also explained important
cultural differences. For instance, unlike in Mexico, where traffic
violations are extremely rare, people get pulled over frequently in
the U.S., even for seemingly miniscule infractions like broken
headlights.
At the state level, the CNUC holds educational workshops
throughout the year, often focusing on citizen rights, such as those
to education and healthcare. There are also classes on topics like
capitalism and Mexican history. At the weekly state meetings, Luz or
another staffer usually begins by setting an agenda and making
announcements about the upcoming events. The floor is then
turned
Figure 7. Photo from CNUC Office Bulletin Board in Tlaxcala
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Source: Williams 2009

over to CNUC members, who are all required to participate. Active
participation means a willingness to share your thoughts and
experiences in front of everyone. For example, after the visit by the
assistant to the Secretary of Education, approximately 30 CNUC
members sat in a circle to reflect on ways of improving the
education of their children. Pancho, a CNUC employee, facilitated
the discussion. For over an hour and a half, participants exchanged
ideas with each other. Some spoke voluntarily, while others were
prompted by Pancho’s questions to speak. At one point in the
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meeting, the discussion turned to the role of parents in the
education of their children. Since I, too, formed part of the circle, I
was asked to participate. Pancho asked me about my experiences
with Machismo in Mexico, and how it compared to the U.S. I told
them that women generally have more freedoms in the U.S. and
are less confined to traditional household duties, such as cooking,
cleaning, and childcare, typical for Tlaxcala women. People
listened attentively, clearly appreciative of my unique perspective.
My comments helped Pancho get his main point across—that
fathers, too, need to help in the house and show a vested interest in
their children’s educations at home. Otherwise, male-dominant
power structures and gendered roles perpetuate themselves. As
was true in all the local and state meetings I attended, the women,
not the men, dominated the discussion. Before the rupture with the
PRT, the CNUC was almost exclusively male, but women now
compose over 60 percent of its membership. As more men have left
for the U.S., traditional roles have been reversed. In Nanacamilpa,
nearly all the organizers are women. As one female organizer from
Nanacamilpa told me, “The gain of the CNUC, more than power, is
the learning and knowledge of the rights that we have” (personal
correspondence 2009).
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Several factors have contributed to the success of the CNUC.
First, its members live the same brutal realities and share general
interests for better healthcare, education for their children, and
access to government subsidies. None of these are accessible
without exerting pressure on corrupt government channels. The
organizational structure allows the CNUC to address both state and
local issues. The CNUC’s strong organizational capacity, ability to
attract media attention, and persistent performances pose enough
of a threat to the government that, rather than resort to repression,
it is often forced to negotiate with the organization. The incentive
for involvement in the CNUC also extends beyond the tangible. By
educating its members, the CNUC empowers its participants,
especially women, transforming them from passive into active
participants who are willing to challenge state authority. The CNUC
has also forged alliances with three other movements in Tlaxcala:
UPADE, the Braceros, and Apizaco’s sex workers.40 All four
organizations are adherents to La Sexta and La Otra’s national

40

UPADE is an urban movement, composed of about 3,000 small business people living on
the periphery of Apizaco, that fights for issues like lower property taxes and preventing the
privatization of the city’s garbage collection. Apizaco has Tlaxcala’s highest population of
sex workers and its largest union. Although sex work is a legalized occupation in Mexico, it
is not treated as such. Sex workers, for example, do not have access to any healthcare
benefits. The Braceros are Mexican campesinos who worked in the U.S. on 3-6 month
contracts during the period of 1942-1964. As a way of ensuring that Braceros would return
to Mexico, the Mexican government withheld 10 percent of their wages in a special
retirement fund, which the Braceros would receive if, and only if, they returned to Mexico
after their visas expired. But 50 years later, the Braceros still haven’t received a cent of their
retirement funds.
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coalition. In 2006, the CNUC housed Marcos and the other
comandantes when they passed through Tlaxcala during La Otra’s
initial tour through Mexico. During their stay, all CNUC members
read La Sexta, agreeing collectively to subscribe to its national
program of struggle. The CNUC has since held educational
workshops explaining and discussing the ideas presented in La
Sexta. No one can become an official member of the CNUC
without first having read and signed La Sexta.
According to Alejo, “La Otra has further opened the
possibility of coming together. It’s created a knot of fights. Whatever
injustice in whichever place, we feel it. Among everyone, we’ve
made a single knot that is difficult to break” (personal
correspondence 2009). Rivera pointed to some examples of this,
speaking of the relationships the CNUC has formed with
organizations in Mexico City, like the Red Nacional Contra la
Represión y por la Solidaridad.41 She says La Otra has created a
horizontal network that responds quickly to violence. Amidst police
violence and arrests against citizens in Campeche last summer, for
example, several Otra organizations, including CNUC, sent
representatives to protest. The CNUC also attends national

41

This organization, its name translated as “The National Network against Repression and
for Solidarity,” organizes mainly around the issue of releasing political prisoners in Mexico,
particularly those from Atenco.
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conferences, such as the 2009 meetings of the Consejo Nacional
Indígena in Michoacán and the Zapatista Continental American
Meeting Against Impunity in Chiapas. Most of the CNUC’s resources,
however, continue to go towards its efforts within Tlaxcala. At least
for now, La Otra is, as Rivera describes it, a network of response, of
solidarity, and of defense. It is unclear whether it will manifest itself
into something more organized in the future. “I don’t think La Otra
has a definitive end,” Luz says. “There is so much possibility for
transformation. The particular objective of La Otra is to give all the
power to those beneath, and they’ll make it [La Otra]. That’s what
autonomy is, the people taking their destiny in their own hands”
(personal correspondence 2009).

The Pancho Villas
La Otra Campaña is a perfect analysis of the national reality. La
Otra defines itself as anti-capitalist and with that one has to
recognize that there are many positions, even contradictions
within this group. La Otra is the worker, the indigenous, the
students, young people, anarchists, and socialists. There are many
positions. … But we’re all part of the same exploited class.
—Gerardo Meza, organizer with Mexico City’s Frente Popular
Francisco
Villa Independiente
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Comparatively speaking, the Frente Popular Francisco Villa
Independiente (the Panchos)42 organizes and governs itself quite
distinctly from the two other movements I have analyzed thus far.
While CNUC members idolize the Zapatistas, the Panchos tend to
separate themselves from the EZLN. As one of their leaders,
Gerardo, explained, “We are not Zapatistas. We are Villistas with our
own project. Of course we coincide with the Zapatista project, but
we are not the same” (personal correspondence 2009). The
Panchos’ strong sense of self-identity stems from their historical
origins. The organization formed in the aftermath of the Mexican
City earthquake of 1985, which destroyed the infrastructure and
homes of much of the city. In the days and months following the
quake, the structural deficiencies and corruption of the Mexican
political system were exposed, as the government failed to
adequately respond to the needs of those affected, especially in
the poor peripheries where the majority of the city’s population
lived. The Panchos, led primarily by leftist university students, began
organizing these poor communities to demand land and housing
from the government. From the outset, the Panchos declared
themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-state. Today, the Panchos
represent over 6,000 families in Mexico City from 12 different
42

The organization takes its name from Francisco “Pancho” Villa, the leader of the
Northern front of the Mexican Revolution.
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colonias,43 most located in the eastern outskirts about an hour from
the city’s center. In addition, the Panchos form part of a national
organization called UNOPII,44 which works with similar housing
movements in the states of Chiapas and Guanajato.
The Panchos no longer designate themselves strictly as a
housing movement, but rather as a “fight for the projects of life”
(Palabras Pendientes 2006, 123). Within the colonias, they have
begun various cultural, educational, and health initiatives to move
towards autonomy. Like CNUC, they do not identify with a political
party and still rely on government funding for the majority of their
projects. I spent two weeks living with a family in Acaptzingo, a
gated community of about 590 families (more than 2,500 people)
built from scratch 12 years ago. The living conditions within
Acaptzingo are comparable to those of a lower-class
neighborhood in the U.S. Families and couples live in well-furnished
one and two-story concrete houses and apartment buildings.
According to local residents, safety is the single greatest benefit of
belonging to a Pancho colonia. Acaptzingo is located in an
impoverished and dangerous sector of Mexico City. In plain sight,
just beyond the colonia’s fence, sits an opposite reality—a virtual

43

In Mexico, colonia refers to a residential area or neighborhood.
“Unidad Nacional de Organizaciones Populares de Izquierda Independiente” translates
as “National Unit of Independent Popular Organizations of the Left.”

44
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shantytown. This community used to form part of the Panchos, but
in 1997, about half of the movement split from the Panchos and
aligned

Figure 8. Photo of Acaptzingo Houses under Construction

Source: Williams 2009
themselves with the PRD.45 I was told not to venture off alone
outside the gates and to return home before 10 p.m. In one of the
few times that I left the colonia, a teenager with blood-shot eyes
tried to sell drugs to my American friend and me in broad daylight.
My host family told me drugs and gangs were a major problem in
45

This group aligned with the PRD still identifies itself as part of the Frente Popular Francisco
Villa, the original name of the movement. The Panchos I refer to in this essay have added
“Independiente” to the end of this name, in order to distinguish between the two
organizations.
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the surrounding neighborhoods, but not within Acaptzingo. Local
law enforcement is not allowed past the gates, which are guarded
24 hours a day, on rotating schedules, by community members.
Acaptzingo has its own soccer fields, radio station, and community
center. The community center offers a wide range of culture, art,
and history classes. In one such class, a student from UNAM46
helped five women compile a pictorial and written history of the
Acaptzingo colonia. The construction of a small hospital is also
underway, and plans for primary and secondary schools have been
discussed.
Organizationally, about 90 people compose the various
commissions of the Panchos in Acaptzingo, divided into areas such
as education, culture, health, vigilance, work, cleaning, and
funding. Every two weeks, the people of Acaptzingo gather in a
community assembly to discuss the agendas of the commissions.
These meetings are optional and attendance has dropped
significantly over the years. The Panchos have a central office
where eight individuals act as permanent employees. These are the
radical militants, responsible first for organizing the Panchos in the
mid 1980s. The office is adorned with posters of Latin America’s
revolutionary heroes, including Che, Bolivar, and Castro. In contrast

46

La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México is the largest public university in Mexico.
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to the Zapatistas, the Panchos do not oppose vertical decisionmaking.
We are horizontal in the consult of talking to people, but when the
assemblies make decisions, they do it in a vertical way. … In the
(Zapatista) Good Government Councils, they nominate new
members every 15 days. Structurally, this causes you problems
because I’m going to speak with you, but in 15 days I have to talk
with another person. (Gerardo, personal correspondence 2009)

Interestingly enough, I found diverging ideologies to be
problematic in Acaptzingo as well. Through my conversations, I
realized that the Pancho leaders hold one vision of the Pancho
movement, while the colonia’s residents clearly

Figure 9. Photo outside Pancho Office in Acaptzingo

Source: Williams 2009
Figure 10. Photo of Posters Hanging inside Pancho Office
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Source: Williams 2009
hold another. In my interviews with townspeople, most of them
expressed concern about the unity of the organization. As one
woman told me, “It’s not the way it used to be. People don’t care
anymore” (personal correspondence 2009). Specifically, they
mentioned how many people no longer participate in the bi-weekly
assemblies, nor take advantage of the educational and cultural
activities offered by the community center. Some have openly
voiced their discontent for having to guard the colonia’s gates,
urging the movement to hire its own security guards. Gerardo, not
surprisingly, disagreed with this assessment. He said this
misperception was due to a lack of action, not unity:
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Before consolidating this project, of housing, health, and culture,
the mobilizations were much more frequent. The people were
accustomed to a certain rhythm of mobilization, one or more
mobilizations each month. Now we don’t organize a march to
demand … materials or chairs or tables for the school. We are
going to build it ourselves. … We are in another stage of the
process. We have advanced a lot. … This perception that now we
aren’t so united as before can be attributed to the fact that
what’s lacking is practice, mobilization. (personal correspondence
2009)

To a certain extent, Gerardo’s explanation makes sense. People
often stop mobilizing when the incentive to do so no longer exists.
But I think he underestimates the legitimacy of the concerns voiced
by the people with whom I spoke, who, after all, likely represent the
majority opinion of the Pancho movement in Acaptzingo. Gerardo
argues that lack of mobilization is an indication of the movement’s
progress. This is partly the case. In comparison to the surrounding
neighborhoods, the people of Acaptzingo live in luxury. For many, a
nice house and safe streets for their children are sufficient. But a
lack of demonstrations—“practice,” as Gerardo calls it—does not
necessarily correlate to or explain the community members’
feelings of disunity. As both the Zapatistas and the CNUC have
demonstrated, claim making and performance do not, by
themselves, generate unity. Equally important for both groups has
been the process of “framing” their struggle, defined as the
“conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared
understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and
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motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996, 6). This includes the
identification of clear goals and the promotion of a shared
ideology. In the Zapatista rhetoric, creation of a critical
consciousness—one’s understanding of one’s own reality—is what
moves people towards collective action. The Zapatista struggle has
been framed as one for human dignity, a dignity threatened by the
capitalistic and political order. CNUC has adopted a similar vision of
Mexico and the world.
The Panchos of Acaptzingo, on the other hand, seem to lack
this collectivity. My discussions indicated that unlike the radical
Pancho leaders, the people of Acaptzingo generally show little
political interest. Their indifference to the political agenda of the
Pancho movement suggests a divide between the leadership and
its base. In fact, few of the people I spoke with could articulate why
the capitalistic system was hurting Mexico. Several admitted to
having voted in the recent elections. Equally as telling, not a single
one of the eight individuals that I interviewed had read La Sexta
document. Most weren’t familiar with La Otra—this in a colonia that
Marcos visited during his 2006 tour. Again, this disconnect can be
explained in two ways. First, that the motivation to mobilize has
disappeared because the majority of the population has already
achieved what it set out to do; they desire a return to normalcy.
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And secondly, that most people in Acaptzingo lack the individual
and shared consciousness necessary for constructing a unified front.
In the Zapatista and CNUC communities, the latter has mainly been
accomplished through education. The size of Acaptzingo certainly
puts it at a disadvantage. Its 2,500 residents are more than the
comparable totals in the typical Zapatista and CNUC communities.
But the Zapatistas and CNUC have largely been able to overcome
and neutralize the difficulties often associated with high
membership by creating horizontal structures that allow for local
communities to govern and educate their autonomous spaces
according to their own practices. Not surprisingly, due to effective
framing techniques that help generate a shared identity, these
practices usually reflect and coincide with the methods and
agendas of the national movements. I cannot speak for other
Pancho colonias within Mexico City, but at least within Acaptzingo,
there are clear signs of disillusionment among the community
members. Gerardo says the Panchos want to be “autonomous like
the Zapatistas. … This project corresponds to the needs of the
population. … We believe the people make history, not the leaders”
(personal correspondence 2009). If this is indeed the case, then he
and the Pancho leaders need to start taking such signs of disunity
more seriously. Autonomy is only possible through the will of the
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people, and if the people become convinced that collective
action is neither necessary nor beneficial, then demobilization could
be imminent.
Like Acaptzingo, La Otra faces similar obstacles—particularly,
that its lack of specific ideology and the resulting myriad people
and groups that make up the movement, many with distinct views
on how to govern, could ultimately hurt the union and success of
the broader social movement. Outside of Chiapas, Mexico City
remains the backbone of La Otra. The events at Atenco in 2006
proved this, as dozens of social movements and grassroots social
organizations, including the Panchos,47 traveled to protest police
brutality and arrests.
Figure 11. Photo of Sign Displayed during Atenco Rally in the Zócalo

47

The Panchos had previously mobilized with Atenco’s Peoples Front in Defense of the
Land in protest of a new Mexico City airport in 2002.
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Source: Williams 2009
According to Gerardo, if Otra activists had not penetrated and
broken the fence established by the military, the “terror would have
remained for more time in Atenco” (personal correspondence
2009). La Otra also helped draw media attention to the repression.
On May 30, 2006, 15,000 marched through Mexico City to
demonstrate for the release of the Atenco prisoners. Smaller
marches, pickets, and protests were held throughout Mexico, the
U.S., and internationally during May and June (Cuninghame 2007,
17). Nearly four years later, the release of the prisoners continues to
be La Otra’s primary organizing effort in Mexico City.
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In July, I attended a meeting in Mexico City where about 100
activists gathered from various organizations—the Panchos, La Red
Nacional Contra la Represión y por La Solidaridad, as well as
representatives from student, women, sex worker, and other
groups—to discuss this issue of prisoners. At the front of the room sat
five individuals, each from a different organization. A young woman
from a student movement began by explaining the meeting’s
agenda. She proposed a new phase in the movement for the
release of prisoners, one in which La Otra would organize to
demand the release of all of Mexico’s political prisoners, not just
those from Atenco. For the next hour or so, people at the front table
and in the audience went back and forth exchanging their ideas
for ways in which to effectively carry out this new plantón, to begin
officially on August 31, 2009. Should we hold another protest in the
Zócalo, perhaps another march? How do we get the government’s
attention? With no one facilitating, little was decided by the end of
the meeting. It was thus agreed that each organization should draft
a preliminary plan and email it to a general listserv, so that
everyone could come to a meeting in two weeks having read and
critiqued the proposals.
Despite his spot at the front table, Gerardo was silent
throughout the meeting. Later that night, I spoke with him back in
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the Acaptzingo office. He seemed frustrated, though not at all
surprised, by the meeting’s results. La Otra has no structure, he told
me. After witnessing that night’s meeting, I understood the
Panchos’ incredulous attitude towards horizontal decision making
and their insistence upon using vertical structures. In other words,
when there are 100 people in a room, decision-making
responsibilities need to be delegated. This is especially true when
dealing with distinct groups somewhat unfamiliar with each other. In
a 2006 interview, Gerardo said: “Essentially, La Otra Campaña has
to go consolidating itself. It has to go fortifying its form of doing
things. It has to generate an adequate structure. We don’t say that
it has to be a particular structure. But we do say that we have to
structure the way we can change society” (Palabras Pendientes
2006, 126). Four years later, La Otra is no closer to achieving the
structure Gerardo had envisioned. “In the future, La Otra has to
change into something different,” Gerardo says. “… Within a few
years I see myself being active in a political organization, not a
social organization like this (La Otra), but in a political organization
in which the task will be the transformation of society. What does La
Otra lack? Political organization” (personal correspondence 2009).
Gerardo provided no specific insight into what this political
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organization would look like, or how it might function, only that it
would be, like La Otra, anti-capitalist and anti-electoral.

VI. Conclusions and Last Reflections
In this paper, I have reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of
La Otra Campaña by comparing the dynamics of three
movements: the Zapatistas, the CNUC, and the Panchos, each with
its own program of autonomy. No longer reliant on the state, the
Zapatista community of Oventic practices a type of selfgovernment and horizontal decision-making that transcends the
ethnic-racial boundaries of traditional mestizo and indigenous
Mexico. With the CNUC, a rural peasant organization modeled after
the Zapatistas, we see a similar movement towards autonomy.
Education has empowered its members, especially women, into
taking leadership roles to challenge inefficient political models.
Finally, I have analyzed the Panchos, an urban movement living a
distinct reality. Here, two potential issues have been identified: (1)
the ideological differences (i.e., horizontalism versus verticalism)
impeding or threatening the construction of alliances in Mexico
City, and (2) the seeming disconnect between the leaders and
community members in the Panchos’ Acaptzingo colonia.
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The Panchos remind us just how broad La Otra truly is, and
that within it are a number of smaller movements with their own
problems and ways of solving these problems. On the one hand,
this is the beauty of La Otra, that is, its openness to many paths, to
no one way of doing things—Zapatismo’s idea for a “world in which
many worlds fit.” But this is also the main structural challenge
confronting La Otra. If one puts Marxist-Leninists in a room together
with Zapatistas, ideologies are bound to clash. La Otra is banking
that certain commonalities—mainly a shared resentment for
capitalism and Mexico’s political system—will prove enough to
overcome these differences in order to unite in struggle.
Clearly the principles of Zapatismo are beginning to filter
down to a broader coalition, but overcoming generations of
Mexican paternalism and corporatism is not easy. As Mexican
journalist Lydia Cacho sees it, “To understand Mexico, you have to
understand that corruption is not a political issue, but a cultural
one” (public lecture 2010). Corruption has become so ingrained in
Mexican society that most Mexicans do not perceive political
reform as a realistic expectation. Corruption, in other words, has
bred cynicism throughout Mexico—so much so, in fact, that the vast
majority of Mexicans do not participate in political organizing. As of
2000, only seven percent of Mexicans were affiliated with a political
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organization, six percent had signed a petition, seven percent had
joined a boycott, and eight percent had attended a demonstration
(Camp 2007, 66-67). Partly for this reason, of the 50 million Mexicans
living in poverty, many remain indifferent to La Otra. Others
disagree with its politically radical program. As history teaches us,
social commonality and linked fate neither fully erase tension nor
necessarily imply cooperation and collective action.
Near the end of my research, I visited San Juan de Chamula,
an indigenous municipality on the outskirts of San Cristóbal that
attracts hundreds of tourists each day to its markets and unique
Catholic Church.48 The poverty in this part of Chamula equals, if not
exceeds, that which I saw in most Zapatista communities. The
majority of houses—wooden shacks built over dirt—double as
storefront businesses. Tzotzil women, dressed in long fur skirts, woolwoven vests, and purple and green-embroidered blouses, stand
outside their homes waiting for foreign customers. Meanwhile,
Chamulan children mingle near the town center in front of the
church, competing with each other for pesos from the horde of
tourists. Despite apparent cultural, social, and economic similarities,
48

Here there is an interesting syncretism between Catholicism and traditional Mayan
practices. Inside the “Catholic” church, pine needles, covered in candles, take the place
of pews. Shamans chant in Tzotzil and worshippers carry bottles of Coke. “In indigenous
tradition, it is believed that one must burp in order to expel evil spirits when praying.
Originally, a fermented maize drink was used in this custom, but it has since been all but
replaced, thanks to the divine efficiency of Coca-Cola” (Evans 2006, 16). When I visited
the church, other soda beverages, such as Sprite and Mountain Dew, were also used.
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Chamulans and the Zapatistas remain bitter rivals. “Zapatistas are
criminals,” one Chamulan man told me. “They are flojos (lazy
people) who don’t like to work” (personal correspondence 2009).
Nubia mirrored this resentment, calling Chamula “a tourist town”
whose people remain corrupted by the state (personal
correspondence 2009). What explains this tension? One reason is
Chamula’s political allegiance to the PRI, which, not unlike the
corporatist model of decades past, continues to exert authority
over the population through the allocation of land and resources.
Not surprisingly, state intervention—be it through paramilitary
groups, government assistance programs like Oportunidades, or just
old-style corporatist politics—continues to be one of the road blocks
to Otra unity.
Despite these obstacles, four years into its global project, La
Otra has built a social movement campaign. Around Mexico, it has
established social networks that respond collectively to issues like
state repression. In 2007, the EZLN called for adherents of La Sexta to
organize a peace camp to Cucupá, a small indigenous community
in Baja California that had lost its ancestral right to fish. Several Otra
groups, including the Panchos and California community-based
movements, organized caravans to the peace camp. As one
participant from Los Angeles described it, “We were there to not
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only support the rights of the indigenous people of Baja (California)
but to show our collective power. Members of our small community
center in East L.A. felt that it was necessary to share our experiences
of struggle here as well as learn what is going on in Mexico first
hand” (Zugman 2008, 352). Solidarity is being constructed among
previously unconnected actors and organizations through events
like the Festival of Digna Rabia (Dignified Rage), held throughout
Mexico and the world in December 2008. “The closest thing to La
Otra is the Festival of Digna Rabia,” the CNUC’s Luz says. “It’s when
we all saw each other, when we realized the fortitude of what we
were building” (personal correspondence 2009). In Mexico City,
organizations set up tables in the Zócalo and participated in various
forums. The CNUC, for example, took part in a panel titled “The
Other Paths: Other Social Movements.” Left-leaning academics
gave presentations on the politics of Mexico and La Otra
alternative. Beyond Mexico are a variety of organizations adhering
to La Otra, like the Movement for Justice in el Barrio, an immigrant
rights group in East Harlem, New York City, where members practice
collective decision making and direct democracy at leadership
meetings, and participate in educational workshops about the
causes of social injustice. The creation of these networks is an
accomplishment in itself. Such broad oppositional networks often
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serve as the building blocks for social movements (Tilly & Tarrow
2007, 117).
But are these networks sustainable? Are they closer to
resembling the coalition formed with CNUC—where membership in
La Otra seems to truly mean something—or that with the Panchos of
Acaptzingo, where membership seems to imply little more than
loose, verbal commitment? In the end, the success of La Otra
hinges on its ability to fortify alliances and strengthen allegiances.
This is not difficult to discern. The tougher question, of course, is how
to go about building these relationships. The Panchos’ Gerardo has
suggested that the key lies in developing strong organizational
structures. Adopting this type of strategy to a movement as large,
heterogeneous, and full of competing interests as La Otra might
seem like the perfect fix. And yet, arriving at such a conclusion,
without also considering the drawbacks to formal organization,
would be foolish. As Piven and Cloward argue quite convincingly, it
was mass defiance, not developed organization, which ultimately
led to the gains made by the unemployed during the Great
Depression and blacks during the civil rights movement. In fact, as
occurred with the unemployed workers, efforts to form organizations
with a mass membership tend to divert resources and attention
“away from the streets and into the meeting rooms” (1977, xxii).
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Instead of mobilizing, movement leaders begin to negotiate with
elites (i.e., the state or organizations with close connections to the
state) for concessions, which the elites are pleased to offer in return
for less disruption and more organization-building. Over time,
however, the organization grows so dependent on the elite for
resources that
leaders and organizers of the lower classes act in the end to
facilitate the efforts of elites to channel the insurgent masses into
normal politics, believing all the while that they are taking the long
and arduous but certain path to power. When the tumult is over,
these organizations usually fade, no longer useful to those who
provided the resources necessary to their survival. Or the
organization persists by becoming increasingly subservient to those
on whom it depends. (Piven & Cloward 1977, xxii)

In the alternative, a loosely-structured organization, Piven and
Cloward claim that movements are far less susceptible to
institutionalization, that is, the state trap—often a precursor to
demobilization.49 For social movements, being dissolved into the
bureaucracy implies a return to political normalcy. As a result,
power struggles between movement leaders are likely to emerge,
and semi-vertical structures, such as the electoral system associated
49

One of the examples they use to explicate this point is the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which emerged in the early 1960s during the civil rights
movement. The organizers of the SNCC, rather than take the legislative and litigation
approach practiced by organizations like the NAACP, preferred direct confrontation. Their
campaigns and commitment to civil disobedience, although lacking in formal structure
and organization, proved extremely effective. As one SNCC participant explained,
“Because the students were too busy protesting … No one really needed ‘organization’
because we then had a movement” (222). As Zinn explains, the SNCC “was not … a
membership organization. This left the adhesion of individuals to the group fluid and
functional, based simply on who was carrying on activity. … The twig was bent, and the
tree grew that way” (223).
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with representative democracy, will be (re)implemented. Hence,
the very mechanisms and structures responsible for perpetuating
social inequality, the ones that the masses fought to eliminate in the
first place, are reaffirmed. Knowing these consequences, it would
seem rather precarious, if not contradictory, for La Otra to pursue
the formalized organization approach. After all, La Otra’s plan—“to
change the world without taking power”—does not involve a
seizure of the state. The CNUC’s Luz prefers the loose model: “There
is no structure,” she says, referring to La Otra. “When we have a
structure, we’ll be finished. If you put in place a delineated
structure, you destroy a horizontal network where everyone is
(represented). It’s no one person. It’s no one structure. We are a
network” (personal correspondence 2009). Using this strategy, the
protests themselves are the focal point of a movement’s organizing
efforts. Of course, this approach works only if the majority of the
participants stay committed to a common cause that brings with it
some clear incentive. Otherwise, as we saw in Acaptzingo, people
may become disillusioned with the movement’s goals and desire a
return to normal life.
I would argue that the most pressing issue facing La Otra’s
movement forward lies precisely in this ability to motivate people
towards collective action. Here again, we turn to the importance of
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(1) constructing a critical consciousness and (2) framing a collective
identity. As Freire asks, “Who better than the oppressed to
understand the terrible significance of an oppressive society? Who
suffers the effects of oppression more than the oppressed? Who
can better understand the necessity of liberation?” (1993, 27). Freire
is exactly right: change starts at the grassroots. Of course, as Freire
well knew, the existence of oppression, by itself, does not guarantee
popular resistance. If it did, then nearly half the world’s population—
the over three billion people living on less than $2.50 a day,
according to the World Bank—would be rebelling (Anup 2010).
That’s why Freire, and Gramsci too, preached the importance of
educational and cultural projects to overcoming oppression. For La
Otra, this means continuing to stress the education of los de abajo,
allowing these historically marginalized and excluded peoples to
think independently and critically, so that, eventually, they will join
hands with other exploited folk and come to understand that only
through action can they change the system driving them into
poverty and despair.
Ultimately, the challenge of constructing an autonomous
anti-capitalist alternative from beneath remains expansive. Many
questions remain: Can La Otra overcome internal division? Will the
government repress it? Can a movement based on collectivity,
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human dignity, and respect survive in the self-interested, powerdriven, twenty-first century? La Otra’s true fate will not be
determined for many years to come. This paper acts as merely a
starting point, aiming to stimulate discussion and plant seeds for
further research on this topic.
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Capstone Summary
My paper examines three manifestations of Mexico’s Otra
Campaña (Other Campaign), a grassroots political movement that
emerged in June of 2005 with the release of the Zapatista Army of
National Liberation’s (EZLN) Sixth Declaration of the Lacandona
Jungle (La Sexta).
In 1983, the EZLN formed in Chiapas through a fusion of two
distinct groups: indigenous peasants and militant leftists. On New
Year’s Day 1994, the same day the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, the Zapatistas declared war
on the Mexican state. They rejected NAFTA on the premise that
indigenous farmers would be unable to compete with large agrobusinesses subsidized by the U.S. and Mexican governments. On a
larger scale, the EZLN fought for economic, political, social, and
cultural justice for the indigenous peoples of Mexico, the victims of
over 500 years of racial discrimination and economic exploitation.
Twelve years after the Zapatista Rebellion, the EZLN proposed
a new phase in its resistance movement:
And so the EZLN has resisted 12 years of war, of military, political,
ideological and economic attacks, of siege, of harassment, of
persecution, and they have not vanquished us. We have not sold
out nor surrendered, and we have made progress. … The hour has
come to take a risk once again and to take a step which is
dangerous but which is worthwhile. Because, perhaps united with
other social sectors who suffer from the same wants as we do, it
will be possible to achieve what we need and what we deserve. A
new step forward in the indigenous struggle is only possible if the
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indigenous join together with workers, campesinos, students,
teachers, employees … the workers of the city and the
countryside. (EZLN 2005)

Thus, La Otra called for an extension of the Zapatista movement
beyond its primarily indigenous base, proposing a broad alliance
among civil organizations and actors, from below and to the left, to
represent the exploited populations of Mexico and the world.
Ideologically, La Otra defines its politics as anti-capitalist and antielectoral. Its radical program seeks to de-legitimize state power
through the “autonimization” of civil society. My paper explains
exactly what Otra adherents mean by this, and analyzes the extent
to which La Otra has succeeded in forming anti-capitalist social
coalitions in Mexico. Overall, I argue that although alliances have
been constructed and allegiances strengthened, certain structural
and ideological differences impede La Otra’s goal to transform
Mexico by developing genuine grassroots democracy. In what
follows, I will summarize the methodology and main points of my
paper.
I carried out field research for my project during the summer
of 2009 in Mexico. I began by spending three weeks with the
Zapatistas in Oventic, an autonomous municipality in the
southernmost state of Mexico, Chiapas. Then I traveled to Tlaxcala,
located in central Mexico, to study for three weeks with organizers
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from a rural farm worker organization called the CNUC. Finally, I
lived for two weeks in a residential neighborhood of Mexico City
with activists who form part of an urban housing movement, called
the Pancho Villas. In each location, I used personal interviews and
conversation, participant observation, and field notes to conduct
my research. In addition, I supplemented my findings from Mexico
with relevant literature on the Zapatistas and social movement
theory. Analyzing each movement through a theoretical lens
allowed me to understand the various factors driving its
mobilization, as well the reasons for which it employed certain
organizational tactics and strategies.
In the introductory section, I explain the emergence of La
Otra in the context of modern-day Mexico. I argue that La Otra is, in
the first instance, a popular response to the neoliberal50 policies
implemented by the elite Mexican political establishment over the
last three decades. In short, these policies have widened the gap
among the country’s rich and poor populations. Mexican
businessmen like Carlos Slim—Forbes magazine’s richest man in
2010, with a net worth of $53.5 billion—have profited handsomely

50

I use the term “neoliberal” and “neoliberalism” to refer to the economic philosophy that
“human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005). In Mexico, neoliberal policies
have reduced government funding for public works and agriculture, privatized key state
businesses, and created interest rates more appealing to foreign capital.
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off the deregulation of the economy, using privatization to create
monopolies based on their interests. Meanwhile, the minimum wage
in Mexico is just $7 per day. Fifty-three million Mexicans live in
poverty, on less than $4 a day, while 15 million live in extreme
poverty, on less than $1 a day. La Otra is also a by-product of
today’s corrupt Mexican state, which has waged an unpopular
“War on Drugs” and become synonymous with electoral fraud, the
suppression of human rights, and military impunity.
In the second section, I explain the theoretical underpinnings
for the rise of La Otra. I first analyze the proliferation of indigenous
movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico during the 1980s and
90s. Yashar argues that they resulted mainly from political
liberalization and changes in state reform policies during the 1980s.
Political liberalization both allowed for and propelled indigenous
revolts because it enabled indigenous peoples to voice their
discontent with the very neoliberal policies associated with it. These
neoliberal reforms reversed the corporatist51 models of decades
past, in which farmers had become reliant on state governments for
land and resources. Such economic restructuring exacerbated the
gap between rich and poor peasants. Fearful that their economic
51

Corporatism implies “a formal relationship between selected groups or institutions and
the government and state” (Camp 2007). In Chiapas, this model functioned for decades,
through which poor peasants received land, resources, and subsidies from the
government in exchange for PRI-party loyalty. The PRI held one-party rule over Mexico for
70 years, until it was defeated in the 2000 national election.
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situation would continue to deteriorate, indigenous peasants began
to organize themselves. In Chiapas, the EZLN emerged for reasons
outlined by Yashar. President Salinas provided the final impetus for
1994’s Zapatista Rebellion when he reformed Article 27 of the
Mexican constitution in 1992, taking away peasants’ rights to
petition for land from the state. Twelve years later, the Zapatista call
for La Otra was, perhaps more than anything else, recognition of its
failures to negotiate with the state and bring about substantive
social and economic change to Mexico’s indigenous populations.
La Otra sought to reinvigorate its anti-neoliberal movement by
inviting other oppressed populations to participate.
In the third section, I analyze La Otra’s anti-political, anticapitalist postures, as described in La Sexta document. I draw
connections between Zapatista rhetoric and the texts of leftist
revolutionary thinkers, including Marx, Lenin, Engels, and the neoMarxist Holloway. La Sexta critiques capitalism as “a social system, a
way in which a society goes about organizing things and people,
and who has and has not, and who gives orders and obeys. …
Capitalism turns everything into merchandise, it makes merchandise
of people, of nature, of culture, of history, of conscience” (EZLN
2005). The Mexican political system, the Zapatistas say, drives this
capitalistic system. La Otra calls for a “new way of doing politics” in
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which civil society52—not Mexico’s political parties—governs the
country. The Zapatistas, interestingly, advocate neither a seizure of
state power nor participation in the electoral system, as other
revolutionary movements have historically done. Rather, they aim to
“autonimize” society—to create self-governing communities
modeled along horizontal structures.
The remainder of my paper compares three movements
within La Otra: (1) the Zapatistas of Oventic, (2) the CNUC of
Tlaxcala, and (3) the Pancho Villas of Mexico City. Certain
drawbacks notwithstanding, I suggest that overall the Zapatistas of
Oventic serve as a model of autonomy for the two other
movements. No longer reliant on the state, Oventic practices a
type of self-government and horizontal decision-making that
transcends the ethnic-racial boundaries of traditional Mexico.
Community members, elected by townspeople, alternate every
two weeks governing the autonomous village. Wealth and power
are distributed equally within society, and work is done for the
collective good; Zapatistas do not receive salaries. In Oventic, the
people have built their own primary and secondary schools and
hospital. Bicultural and bilingual education rescues important

52

In the Zapatista context, civil society is defined as “the sphere of autonomously
organized society, in opposition to that established by the state or directly controlled by it
or associated to it” (Dinerstein 2009).
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indigenous traditions, empowering and fostering a collective
identity among Zapatista students.
In Tlaxcala, the CNUC has appropriated some of the lessons
from Oventic for its own program of autonomy. For example, it has
focused on the education of its participants, particularly women, by
teaching them about the problems associated with capitalism and
the rights they have to free health care and education. At the
same time, the CNUC practices “autonomy” differently from the
Zapatistas. It still relies on the government for aid, and the
organizers’ children attend state schools. The CNUC is a militant
organization that secures concessions from the state, such as
fertilizer subsidies and clean drinking water, by holding protests and
marches, organizing sit-ins, and occupying government offices. The
CNUC has had a close relationship with the Zapatistas since 1994. In
2005, its members read and signed on to La Sexta. Since that time,
the CNUC has participated in several Otra events and formed new
ties with Otra organizations around Mexico.
Finally, I examine the Pancho Villa movement of Mexico City.
Here, I identify two issues. First, the Pancho leaders, unlike those in
the Zapatista and CNUC communities, insist that vertical structures
are necessary for effective governance. As one of the Pancho
leaders explains,
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We are horizontal in the consult of talking to people, but when the
assemblies make decisions they do it in a vertical way. In the
(Zapatista) Good Government Councils, they nominate new
members every 15 days. Structurally, this causes you problems
because I’m going to speak with you, but in 15 days I have to talk
with another person. (Gerardo 2009, personal correspondence)

Second, I noticed a disconnect between Pancho leaders and
community members. Much of the community seems disillusioned.
Membership in the Pancho movement has helped people secure
nice houses and a safe neighborhood for their children, but now,
most of them desire a return to normalcy. Most Pancho participants
know little of La Otra, few have read La Sexta, and some vote in
state and national elections. The Pancho leaders, on the other
hand, have plans to radicalize the organization further into a
structured political movement.
In sum, I assert that the Panchos, despite having gained
certain material benefits, have failed to educate their community
members in the same ways that the Zapatistas and the CNUC have.
As a result, their participants lack the collective identity necessary to
unite a movement towards popular resistance. Furthermore, I see
the Panchos’ ideological differences (i.e., verticalism versus
horizontalism) as one example of a potential obstacle hindering La
Otra’s future progress and unity.
Although this paper leaves questions unanswered, what I do
know is that the success of La Otra hinges on its ability to fortify
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alliances and strengthen alliances. While I do not suggest a specific
solution, I argue that education and the framing of a collective
identity are two crucial elements to this process. La Otra will
undoubtedly have to overcome certain internal contradictions. The
Zapatistas, for example, still partake in capitalistic practices. The
fact that both the CNUC and the Panchos work with the state puts
into question the feasibility of autonomy at both the local and
national levels. These are criticisms that La Otra will inevitably be
forced to address. Ultimately, though, it is simply too early to predict
either the success or failure of La Otra Campaña.

